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1.  INTROIXJCriOO 
Completion  of  the  internal  market  in  1993  will  be  accampanied  by  strong 
hopes  of  faster  growth,  enhanced  OCI't'petition,  reduced  costs  arrl  increased 
wealth,  as predicted in the CECCHINI-report.  (1988).  A toore pessimistic view, 
however,  is that the creation of the intenlal market may  irrleed lead to the 
intetrled  st.rerqtheninJ  of  market  forces,  but  will  also  lead  to  greater 
monopolization  of markets  arrl protectionism - thereby  implyinJ net welfare 
losses.  '!be  result  of  the  internal  market p~  will  be  intensified 
national  arrl  international collusion reducinJ the level of competition.  At 
the  same  time,  protective  regulations  arrl  constraints  in property  rights, 
which were justified to internalize externalities arrl alleviate the negative 
effects  of  market  failures,  will  be  weakened.  'Ibis  paper  considers  these 
conflictinJ viewpoints in the context of public choice theory arrl presents a 
series  of  recarane.OOations  to  reduce  the  potentially  negative  i.nq:>acts  of 
irrlividual egoism arrl rent-seeki.rg1 after CCilpletion of the internal market. 
BERNHOI.Z  has  already  pointed  to  the  toore  negative  aspects  of  1992.  He 
pronounced that  "an erosion of the  advantages  gained  by  rem:winJ  national 
borders  has  to be  expected"  because  of the detrimental effect of interest 
group  activities  in  market-oriented  deloocracies  (  arrl  by  implication  in  a 
European  camunity  without  national  borders),  (BERNHOLZ  1989,  p.1,  p.38). 
While  he  concentrated  on  the  growth  of  the public  sector,  the  increasinJ 
influence  of  pressure  groups  arrl  the  negative  i.nq:>act  of  both  of  these 
phenanena  on  tec::hni.cal  progress,  this paper focusses  on the application of 
public choice theory to the process of European  Integration in general arrl 
the creation of the  internal  market  in particular.  '!hat the growth of the 
1  Ec:x>nanic  agents  have  two  basically different possibilities to  influence 
their prof1.ts:  either 1;Jy  sell~ (toore)  on  t:he  market arrl qy  ~imizing 
their production  ftmction  or bY  iilfluenc~ the  legal  arrl  inst1.tutional 
frame Urrler which they are ~t~  on the market,  e.g.  by cartelization 
or  bv  look::inj  for  subsidies  taX  reductions  or  protection  against 
~tial ~titers.  '!be  latter  activities  are  caJ..led  "rent-~ 
activities".  '1;lley  becxlne  the  nore  praninent  the  nore  a  government  is 
preoared  to  intervene  into  marketS  arrl  the  less  dvnamic  respective 
markets  ~onn. For  sane  literature  on  this  see  EIJ<llANAN,  '!OLLisoN  & 
'IUU.OCK  (eds.  1980):  Towards a  'lbeory of the Rent-Seeki.rg Soc1.ety. -2-
rublic sector ani the increased influence of pressure groups terrls to impact 
negatively an grcMth arrl prOOucti  vity,  is taken as given.  2 
'll1e  ~  llrp:Jrtant  questions to be  ad:lressed  in this  CXlllt.ext  are  :  (a)  if 
neither  the  grcMth  of  the  ~lie sector  nor  the  increasing  influence  of 
interest  groups  can  be  reduced,  are  there  other  means  by  which  their 
negative ~ct  might be alleviated ?  (b)  Who will be the winners arrl losers 
after 1992  in tenns of ~lie  choioo ani rent-see.kinJ ?  In replying to these 
quest.ic:ns,  the  p:1per  relies  heavily  an  the  analysis  presented  in  the 
CD:XlilNI  -report ani BERNIDLZ Is p:lper. 
2 •  '!HE  'lliD:lRY  OF  FUBLIC  ClDICE 
'Ihe theory of p.lblic choice arrl other related theories attempt to apply the 
tools  of  general  ecxmcmi.c  theory to the political decision-making process. 
By  analysi..rg  the  goals  arrl  i..nca'ltives  of different  irrlividual  actors  and 
groups  arrl the prci:>lems  posa:i in  o~si.n;} groups,  these theories give new 
ard  ~while insights  into  the  worki.rgs  am  outcome  of  the  political 
pro:ess.3 
2 • 1.  TI1E  ACTORS I  BEEAVICUR 
1lie ootcx:me  of interaction between politicians, bureaucrats,  pressure groups 
ard voters,  is often ecorx:mically inefficient ani \tJelfare reducing.  '!his is 
the  case  even  t:hc::u:;h  all of tha;e actors behave  rationally vis-a-vis their 
~n short-term utility function.  In explainin;J such a  disappointi.n;} outcome, 
2  The  I)Sgati  ve  ~ct of  a  growin;J  ~lie sector  on  econanic  output  is 
larQely  a  statiStical  ani  measurement  problem  due  to the  fact that  no 
narRets exist for DJblic goois ani. ootp1t: fran this sector is measured by 
its  i.nD..rt.  But it  ootp.rt:  equals  i.rp.rE  t:pere  will be,  by definition  no 
'=ro:ructivity  piQ9Iess  arrl  an  econcmy  whidl  ~rises only  the  ~lie 
Sector  can  nOt  ~  unless  it increases  P-JQlic  employmen'E.  'Iherefore 
cy=rari.son  of  tne  (statistical)  ~  ~onnance or  countries  with 
signi.ficantly different I=Oblic  sect6r/GDP ratios presents difficulties. 
3  Sa:e  Y"..ey  literature  of  PJblic  choice  theo~'  :  WOIANAN  (1975}:  '!he 
Li=.its  of ~;  ~  &  '!ULLOCK  (1962  :  'Ihe  calculus  of  COnsent; 
:::G(!S  (  1.957):  Ea5n:lnic  lheory  of  Dem::x::Iacy;  (1971}:  Bureaucracy 
ard  ~tive  Government;  OISCN  (1965):  'Ihe  IDc:Jic  of  Collective 
;....,.--tion;  0~~ (19?2):. 'Ihe Rise afrl  Qecline of Nations;  WilLIAMSON  (1982}: 
:t.e E.ccn::r:lic  Instl  'bltlons of cap1  tall.Sm. -3-
we  nust begin by addressirg a  number of questions  :  What  are the goals of 
these groups of actors ?  Why  do they act as they do arrl what are the drivirg 
forces  behirrl  them?  Public  choice  theory  gives  sc.rre  answers  to  these 
questions.  'Ihese  answers  can  be  described  here  briefly  (arrl  admittedly  a 
little bit simplistically)  as follows  : 
'Ihe  groups  of  politicians,  OOreaucrats,  pressure  groups  arrl  vote~ are 
naturally  catqX>Sed  of  irrlividual  actors.  Each  irrlividual  actor  aims  to 
increase his own  benefit without necessarily havirg regard to the benefit of 
the  other  nenbers  of  the  group  he  represents.  Of  oourse,  his  irrli  vidual 
actions  nust  also  have  positive  effects  on  the  welfare  of  his  group 
nenbers'.  'Ihus,  politicians  want  to  increase  arrl  keep  their  pc7Ner  arrl 
responsibilities  (if they are  in power)  or they want to get into pc7Ner  (if 
they do not have it) .  It is not their final goal to fulfil the wishes of the 
party ll¥?lllbers or voters.  Yet,  a ~  corrlition for politicians to reach 
their own  goals is their sucx:::ess  in elections.  since voters are rationally 
uninfonred  this  does  not  imply  that  their whishes  are  always  taken  into 
ac:x::::ount. 
'!he OOreaucrats are st:ruq:jlnJ  for DDre  power  and DDre  OCilpetelx:es,  i.e.  a 
higher  budget,  a  bigg~ department,  without  assumirg  additional 
/ 
responsibility.  It  i~_~t  their  final  goal  to  faithfully  inplerrent 
legislation,  b_gt  it  is  a ~  oorrlition.  However,  since  laws  are 
necessariiy vague  1  bureaucrats can interpret. them in their OWI1  interest  1  SQ 
that they are not forced to .i.nplement legislation quite faithfully. 
Representatives of interest groups are also st:ruq:jll.nJ for ad:litional  power 
am influence,  both of which are correlated to the size am strergt:h of the 
particular interest group.  Again,  it is a  necessary  side effect that they 
increase  the  benefit  of  the  nenbers  of  the  group  they  represent  by 
influencing politicians am other decision makers. 
Voters are interested in maximising their benefit fran the political process 
am public services provided.  '!hat they control p.lblic activity by vat~ is 
only a  side .effect,  not the final goal. -4-
Finally,  editors  as  ent:zepreneurs  in the  1l8iia  fight  for  higher  profits 
through  higher  circulatioo  am  higher  revenues  fran  advertisements. 
Meanwhile,  joumalists am  editorial staff are interested in a  higher wage 
bill.  Besides  these  final  goals  they  also  want  to have  influence  on  the 
society  in which  they live.  So,  the media  not ally make  profits but also 
spread infonnation am serve as the fourth power alorg with the legislative, 
judicial ani executive power.  However,  this side effect is welcaned by at 
least sane sections of society. 
2.  2.  IN1'ERFERENCES  m 'lHE  DECISION-MAKING  PROCESS 
What  inpact do the different goals am attitudes of the participants in the 
political decision-mald.rg process have on the provision of p.lblic services ? 
'!he politicians will b:y to avoid any major oonfl.ict with representatives of 
those groups which are influential am  powerful an:i thus inportant to their 
(re) election.  '!hey  will try to gain the  SURX>rt  of  such  groups,  e.g.  by 
givin;J  them  subsidies which  have to be  fi.nan:si by other less influential 
groups.  If burdens  have to be distributed,  politicians will try to burden 
groups  by  .inperoeptible  means  (st:ruc:9le  for  intransparency) ,  e.g.  by 
existirg  tax  progression,  levyirg  of  indil:ect  taxes  etc.  '!hey  will 
particularly avoid inplementin;J or even SURX>rtin] a  transparent equivalence 
financin] system,  e.q.  in the fonn of contributions or duties.  'Ihe existing 
bldgetary  system  arxi  the shapirg of the  institutional legislative process 
nonnal.ly  facilitates  such efforts to avoid  transparency.  'Ihe  outcane  is a 
very  carplicated  tax  ani  subsidization  system with  many  loop-holes  known 
only to specialized insiders. 
Bureaucrats  are  anxious  to  retain  as  nuch  autonany  as  possible  by 
suJ:mittin;J only a  minina.nn  of infonnation to the decision-maker;  in this way 
they  retain  a  very  ilrportant  infonnation  advantage.  FurtllernDre,  the 
infonnation  suJ:mitted  to  the  decision-maker  is  biased  in  favour  of  the 
bureaucrats.  '!his means  tllat projects which  the administration support are 
presented in a  very favourable light while less SURJQrted projects will not 
receive  favourable  treatment.  In addition,  the administration will try to -5-
reduce its i.nplt,  (as lag as this does not result in a  smaller budget)  by 
relyi.n;J as far as p:ssible on external expert advice.  '!he preferred outcome 
in the  eyes  of b.lreaucrats ani pressure groops will be  that the  extemal 
experts provide advice which  pleads  in favoor  of higher public budgets or 
new  administration units.  '!his  was  the case for the nuclear irrlustry,  for 
exanple.  In a  choice between the inplementation of a  sinple ani transparent 
procedure  or  a  llDre  carplica:tErl  ani  less  transparent  procedure,  the 
bureaucrats  will  cpt  for  the  latter.  On  the  one  harxl,  llDre  canplicated 
procedures are nonnally connected with a  higher need for resources,  inplyi.n;J 
a  higher budget am JOOre staff. On the other han:l,  a  llDre canplicated proce-
dure reduces the degree of transparency am thus heightens the deper:rlence of 
third parties on the administration. 
'!he  representatives of interest groops try to manipulate  the decisions  of 
politicians ani the administration to their CMn advantage.  'Ibis is achieved 
partly by  the distribution of  biased  infonna.tion,  which,  however,  may  be 
considered by the administration arrl politicians as an essential element of 
day-to-day  business.  Decisions  may  also  be  influenced  by  inplicit  or 
explicit  threats.  'lhe  threat  of  influenci.n;J  voters'  attitudes  ani voti.n;J 
behaviour  may  be  quite  successful  against  politicians.  '!he  administration 
may  react to threats  to make  daily business  llDre  difficult or threats to 
apply pressure through the hierardly.  '!he fanners'  pressure groups se:tVe  as 
an  exanple of this kirrl of behaviour.  '!here are  no  c:x::rrm:>n  rules with the 
exception of the p:rchibition of active ani passive bri.becy. 
'!he  in:tividual  voter  is  badly  infonnecl.  Observi.n;J  the  interplay  between 
politicians,  administration ani pressure groops,  he is ex>nfident of his own 
marginal  influence  on  both the  decision-makirg  process  ani the  result of 
elections.  Assumin:]  rational behaviour on the part of the in:tividual voter 
there nust  be  a  reason why  in the market process the  in:tividual  ex>nsumer 
nonnally invests substantial t:ime  arrl resources in ~  infonna.tion while 
in  the  political  process  the  irrli.vidual  voter  seems  uninterested  in 
acquiri.n;J infonnation.  '!he answer is to be fourxl  in the context of absolute 
am relative infonnation costs : -6-
(1)  No.I11Blly  the  bureaucracy  ani  the  politicians  prefer  not  to  release 
infornntian to the  outside  ani especially  not to the voter;  this would 
facilitate greater control  an  their activities.  'Ihus,  it is made  quite 
difficult for the voter to aCX}Uire  the necessary infonnatian. 
(2)  If the irdividual voter finally aCX}Uires  the infonnation necessary for a 
well-informed  voti.n;J  decision  how  will  he  use  it?  He  cannot  influence 
political  decisian-ma.k:irg  at  all.  Consequently,  there  will  be  an 
inadequate  yield  fran  the  aCX}Uired  infonnation.  'lherefore,  it makes  no 
sense  for the voter to waste ~  in collecti.J'g  infonnation.  He  is 
rationally ill-infonned,  or, as OI.SOO  says with refe.renc:e to IXMNS:  he is 
'tusually rationally ignorant about p.lblic affairs"  (OI.SOO  1982,  p.  26]. 
So  far,  it seems  that only the media  focus  a  steady flow of infonnation on 
the voter.  'lbe  rre..lia  provide this  infonnation  in canbination with  another 
private goOO  - entertainment.  '!hey have their own  role in the interplay of 
actors in the political decision-mald.rg process.  'Ihe representati'Ves of the 
media  are  interested in goOO  relations with  i.np:>rtant  S0\.1I"O:!S  of sensitive 
information in the political, administrative am b.Jsiness spheres.  Deperrlinq 
on the  ideological  stance of the editor ani researcher,  the media will try 
to  infl\.lenJe the behaviour of voters,  mainly through  .i.ncxttplete ani biased 
information,  ~'  subject  to  the  restriction  that  profits  are  not 
reduced  by  p.lbli.shirg  infonration.  As voters react to infonnation  from the 
:oedia politicians,  bureaucrats an:i enterprises have to be interested in good 
relations with  the media.  In consequence,  the media  can be said to partly 
rontrol  the  Government  an:i  the  administration,  at  least  as  regards  sane 
fields of pol  icy ma.k:irg. 
In his  :txx:lk  '"'be  Oloice  of  Collective  Action"  OLSON  (1965)  analysed  the 
proble:s  relatively to the  organisation of  interest groups,  who  provide  a 
p.Jblic  or collective  goOO.  OLSON  lists four main  reasons,  which will make 
the  provision  of  p.lblic  arrl  collective  goods  quite difficult on a  private 
basis,  if it is necessary to provide them with the help of a  group. -7-
(1)  free-rider problem:  An inportant characteristic of p.lblic gocrls is, that 
once they are provided they are p.lblicly available ard canr¥Jt be directed 
exclusively to those who  paid for them.  'Ihe resultirg free-rider problem 
often has  enonoous ~  for organizi.rg groups.  Influer¥.::e  on  the 
public  decision-making  process  is  an  example  of  such  a  public  or 
cx:>llective  good.  Modifications  of  laws  arrl  the  institutional  franework 
never  apply  to  a  sirgle case  but are  cx:rrp.llsory  for all.  'Ihe  nroified 
frane.rork applies also to those who were not participants in the relevant 
pressure groups ard who were rYJt payirg contributions. 
(2)  minimum  size  :  the  larger  the  group  required  to  provide  a  gcxxl 
successfully  the  100re  unlikely  it is  that  there  will  be  a  positive 
outcome.  This  is  because  organization  arrl  negotiation  costs  rise 
progressively  with  the  number  of  group  nembers  involved.  A  group  of 
entrepreneurs,  representi.rg  ten  enterprises,  may  have  a  significant 
influence  on  the  econanic  policy  of  a  country.  Similarly  a  cx:msurrer 
group,  representirg  100  000  COl1Sl..UOerS  could  influerx::e  the  politics  of 
COI1Sl.li'Ce.r  protection.  However,  it is clearly 100re  difficult to  organize 
such  a  large  group  of  consumers  than  it is to organize  a  group  of  10 
entrepreneurs.  The question in this context may  be  :  what are the reasons 
why  it is  sanetimes  sufficient  to  be  a  member  of  a  small  group  arrl 
sanetimes it is not.  This question will be touched in chapter 6  of this 
paper. 
(3)  loW-benefit problem  :  The  lower a  potential member  rates the potential 
benefit to himself  fran  any  given  organised  action,  the less likely it 
becx:lnes  that he will be attracted as  a  payirg member of a  correspon::ling 
pressure group.  Therefore,  we  are nore  likely to  fin:i  a  pressure group 
which focuses  on the interests of tenants,  car CMnerS  or steel prcducers 
than one which focusses  on the interests of cyclists.  'Ihe  reason is that 
for  the  first  group  the  relevant  products  count  relatively  highly  in 
their total  incane use or origin.  'lllat is one reason why proce:lures are 
better organized in certain fields of policy than in others. -8-
(4)  Selective  incentives  :  If  it  is  not  possible  to  give  additional 
selective  incentives  accanpanyirg  the  provision  of  a  public  or 
collective  gcxx:l,  it beoanes  less  likely  that the  public  gcxx:l  will  be 
supplied at all.  'Ihese  selective incentives are necessary to evade  the 
free-rider problem.  '!hey are nonnally private goods where an exclusion of 
non-oontributirg users  can be effectively guaranteed.  So it is possible 
to exclude  non-members  of trade  unions  fran  the  benefits  of union-nm 
strike :fun:is;  benefits out of this fW'Xi  are for members  only.  Political 
parties are another exanple;  in addition to political influence they can 
offer  jabs  in the  goverrnne:nt  am;or  in  the  parliam:mt  exclusively  to 
payirg members of the party. 
'Ihe m:ininum-size am selective-incentive criteria are mainly responsible for 
the relative uninp:>rtance of tax payers,  consumers,  enviromnental protection 
groups,  etc  ..  '!hey  remain,  as  OLSON  calls them,  latent groups.  'lb achieve 
their goals,  these groups require high lTe.l'li:ershi.p,  but are unable to exclude 
non-members  fran the results of their pressure. 
If  we  consider  (1)  the  goals  of  the  actors  sketched  above,  (2)  the 
incentive  sb:ucture,  (3)  the  fact  that  recent  institutional  realities 
Slg)Ort  both  am  (  4)  the  asymetJ:y  in  organizi.rg  interest  groups,  also 
sketched  above,  sane outcanes of the political decision-making process can 
be easily explained.  'lherefore,  public dloioe theory can be seen to explain 
many  important  developnents  1  c:x:mrall.y  disaJSsed  unjer  the  heading  Of 
government failure. 
3.  aJARACI'ERIZATION  OF  1992  IN TERMS  OF  :RJBLIC  CH>ICE 
'Ihe adoption of the internal market programme am  of the Sirgle Act derived 
fran the hqle that European integraton will l'lC1N  progress mre successfully, 
leading to increased welfare for all am  not just for minorities.  'lhe hope 
is that there will be a  significant an:i positive inpact on the econamy  and 
labour market,  that canpetition will be enhanced,  prices will be reduced and 
the negative impact of pressure groups an:i of the plblic sector on European 
welfare will be alleviated.  4  But M1at will be c::llan]ed by the internal market 
4  For details see the CECCHINI -report an:i the BERNHOLZ-paper. -9-
p:rogranune  and the Sirgle Act ?  What  i.npact will both programres have on the 
situation and the behaviour of the different groups of actors  (politicians, 
rureaucrats,  interest  groups,  voters  am  media)  ?  'lhese  questions  are 
addressed in the followirg sections.  Public choice theory will be  enployed 
to  seek  worthwhile  explanations  for  the  actual  evolution  of  European 
integration.  In this respect,  it is helpful to look firstly at the actors, 
their institutional surrourx:lin:Js  and the institutions they have created for 
th.emsel  ves. 
3 .1.  'lHE STA'IUS  (p) 
'Ihe  relevant actors,  in the plblic choice context,  durirg the 30  years of 
European Integration were mainly politicians,  bureaucrats,  prcxiucer lobbies 
and  unions  on  the  national  level,  while  the  only  :i.n'portant  group  on  the 
European  level  was  the OOreauc:rats  in the secretary of the Council am  in 
the  Ccmnission.  In  other  words,  those  who  ·expected  high  benefits  fran 
interaction  (high  benefits  in  both,  terms  of  absolute  benefit  am  in 
relation to total i.rdividual benefit)  were playin;J an  :i.np>rtant role,  while 
those bearirg the greater bJrden i.e. oonsumers  (who  had to pay higher food 
prices)  or tax payers  (who had to pay higher taxes)  were not represented as 
they did not realize the connection between European policy am,  e.g. higher 
food  prices  and  higher  taxes.  '!hey  had  no  significant  influence  on  the 
integration  prooess  or  were  not  sufficiently  organized  or  interested 
(low-benefit problem).s 
Moreover,  because  European  integration rapidly became  a  tedmical prooess, 
invisible to the plblic  (like the abolition of tariffs within the EC) ,  it 
received little attention fran the media.  Even when  there were entertaining 
ne;sages  to  be  sold  to  the  plblic  (m::stly  negative  ones  linked  to  milk 
lakes,  butter nomt:ains or the resources  spent  on defining the difference 
between  male  and  female  trousers),  the  lack  of  transparency  in  the 
distribution of responsibilities ensured that the blame was unjustly placed 
5 ~  that  '~<'~,~'t"l  polit"'\T  is  a  +-~'t"l~--~t  polit"'\T  e.g.  that  the 
~  ~icultiiral~iicy i!t desicmedin~wa  tllat-ihstead of market 
intel:venf~ons every  farmer  'WOUld  qe"'t  a  oonthly ¥M  1000_.(  financed out of 
~  revenues,  tax  payers  and  ot.her  social  groups walla  fight  for their 
interests. -10-
on the European institutions  ("the bureaucrats in Brussels")  ani not on the 
national ministers,  suwortirg rent-seek:inj activities of fanners ani other 
pae1erful interest groups. 
In oonsiderinj  the  institutions  created,  it is  noteworthy  that  the  main 
difference  between  the  national  ani  European  ,level  is that  the  European 
Parliament  ani  the  i.nllvidual  voter  are  less  pc:7.¥erful  than  its national 
coonterparts.  '!his  has  made  the  European  Parliament  c:arparable  to  the 
~ition  at the national level. Its goals ani incentives can be describrl 
as  those  of  national  _politicians  not  in  power;  the  final  goal  of  the 
European  Parliament  may  only be to achieve  a  greater role ani to finally 
obtain power despite recent institutional obstacles.  '!he absence of control 
on the real European Govemment  (Council  an:i  Ccmnission)  as .inplied by the 
institutional  structure  of  the  European  Cclmlmities  is a  further  element 
contrib.Itinj  to  an  inefficient  out:cx:lne  of  the  political  decision-making 
process.  PUblic choice theory applied to this institutional franework would 
predict that the political decision-making process at the European level is 
less  efficient  ani  100re  biased  in  favour  of  minority  interests  than 
decision-making at the national level.  '!he main reasons for this prediction 
are  :  (1)  '!he  smaller possibilities of voters  disturbin:J the interplay of 
politicians,  bureaucrats ani pressure groups,  due to the institutionalized 
inpotence of the European Parliament.  (2)  'Ihe lower level of interest aiOOrg 
voters in collect~ infonnation on what is happenin:J in Europe ani finally, 
(3)  the media's  lack of interest in pmlishin;J relevant  infonnation to the 
general pmlic, due to the technical nature of this infonnation ani the lack 
of transparency in policy-making at the European level. 
As  already  mentioned,  pmlic  choice  theory  .inplies  an  asymmetry  in  the 
fonnation  of interest groups  so that latent g:roups  like consumers  an:l tax 
payers are nonnally not organized or have only a  marginal  influence on the 
political  decision-mald.rg  process.  'Ibis  inplication,  however,  is not only 
valid  for  the  national  ani  subnational  level  but  especially  for  the 
supranational level. -II-
'!he asynmetry at the national level has had very inportant inplications for 
the design of the institutionalised decision-makirg process at the European 
level.  '!he national asynmetry was in fact directly institutionalised in the 
composition  of  decidi.nJ  or  advisin.}  organs  at  the  European  level.  '!he 
composition  of  the  Econanic  ani  Social  Ccmnittee  (ESC)  is  described  as 
follaNS  (Art.  193  EEC  Treaty)  '"'he  Ccmnittee  shall  consist  of 
representatives of the various categories of econanic ani social activity, 
in  particular,  representatives  of  producers,  fanners,  carriers,  workers, 
dealers,  cra:ftsn'en,  professional  oocupations  ani  representatives  of  the 
general public".  No  specific reference is made to tax payers,  consumers,  or 
envirornnentalist  groups.  '!hey  are  all  subsumed  urrler  the  tenn  "general 
public".  However,  at least 8  out of the 10 IOOtltioned  groups can be subsumed 
urrler the tenn "producer ani similar interests". 
'!his explicit description of the cauposition of the ESC  is reflected in the 
daily  business  of  European  integration,  for  example  the  Ccmron  CUstans 
Tariff,  the  so-called  anti  -dunpinJ  procedures  ani  self-constraining 
treaties, the carm:m agricultural ani transport policies.  Producer interests 
are  represented  at  every  stage  of  the  decision-makirg  process  while 
interests such as consumers are not. 
3.  2 •  ClJANGES  IN INSTI'IUI'IONS  AND  :RUUS 
'!he  internal  nBrket  programme  aims  at the  abolition  of  welfare-reducirg 
regulations  relatirg to  crossborder migration,  as well  as goods,  services 
ani  capital  IOOVenents.  'lbe  consequenoes  of  abolislti.nJ  these  regulations 
should not be urrlerestimated 
- '!he  abolition of P1ysical  controls  on  goods  ani persons at the internal 
borders,  accompanied by the new  system of EC-wide mutual recognition will 
marginalise crossborder checks  on goods  arrl services in the medium  tenn. 
'!his will  not only  mean  that international  labour share  arrl  crossborder 
flaNS will become even nore inportant, rut will also have inplications for 
national rent--seekirg activities as discussed below. -12-
- Abolition  of discriminatory measures  against  foreign  goods am services 
even  in  exemption  fields  (e.g.  plblic  procurement,  professional 
oocupations)  may  dlarge the canpetition structure am prcx:luction costs in 
affected  sectors.  'lhese  dlarges  will  also  present  a  new  challenge  for 
bureaucrats. 
- '!he international freedan of establishment if it materializes may  lead to 
increased  canpetition  am  cost  reduction  in  sheltered  sectors. 
Liberalisation of capital markets and international financial services may 
have  a  similar effect.  Here,  too,  the principle of  "mutual  recognition" 
will give Jl¥)re  weight to national rules ard minimum  requirements. 
- '!he liberalisation of capital m::wements will allow capital to match those 
irwesbnents  in the Ccmnunity  which  yield the highest rate of return.  In 
this way,  efficiency could be  inproved;  the  inplementation of the white 
paper's measures to inprove crossborder in:lustrial co-operation could help 
in this oontext. 
- Harm:mization  of  irrlirect  taxes  will  allow  enteJ:prises  of  different 
COW'ltries  to  canpete  against  each  other  without  excessive  distortions 
arising from different tax rates. 
'!he  Sin]le  European  Act,  too,  includes  saoo  details  which  affect  the 
institutional  structure  of  crossborder  co-operation  within  the  EC.  Among 
these are : 
- social  policy,  environmental  policy  ard  researdl  policy  are  now  lOC)re 
praninently located in the hierarchy of camnunity responsibilities; 
- foreign  policy  has  now  been  fonnally  elevated  to  the  European  level, 
although it is not mentioned explicitly in the treaties; 
-the  distribution  of  responsibilities  between  Council,  Ccmnission  and 
Parliament has gradually dlarged in favour of the latter; :furth.enoore,  the -13-
threat of  a  veto  in Cooncil  meetirgs has  been  redllCed  by ext.eniinj  the 
application of majority decision-maki.rg. 
Yet,  several  policy  fields  remain,  Were  the  European  crossborder  co-
operation am integration has made little or no  p:rcgress  although econanic 
theory  (fiscal  federalism,  collective  goods  theory)  estimates  potential 
welfare gains6  :  in the allocation policy field,  e.g.  defence matters are 
excluded; the same can be said of distrihttion am stabilisation policy as a 
whole,  although the ''Report on econanic am Daletary union in the European 
Ccmnuni.ty"  of 1989 may give additional inpll.ses in these fields. 
3.  3.  CHANGES  m  'IHE  ACroRS'  SI'IUATIOO 
'!he  CECCHINI -report  expects  a  reduction  of  production  ex>sts  due  to 
econanies of scale,  a  st:rel'gt:henin of caupetition am a  containment of the 
p.lblic  sector.  BERNHOLZ  interprets  the  internal  market  progranune  as  a 
"breakup of an urnisbn:bed developnent" as defined by OIBON  with the chance 
to roll back the negative influence of interest groups arrl the p.lblic sector 
on ecx>nanic perfonnance. 
'!he  enpirical  evidence  provided  by  OIBON  in  "'!he  rise  arrl  decline  of 
nations"  (1982)  in support of this statement,  is quite weak.  OIBON  says that 
"it  is  remarkable  how  rapidly  all  six  initial  members  of  the  European 
Econanic  Ccmmmity  have  grcM1111  durin:f  the  1960s.  '!hen he presents a  table 
(see  table  1)  which  shall  reveal  "that  in  general  they  have  grcMil  toore 
rapidly  than  Australia,  New  Zealarrl,  the  United  Ki.rg:ian,  am  the  United 
- states • • •  In ~  of these initial Cl:iwon market countries growth was more 
rapid in the  1960s,  when  the  Cl:iruon  Market took effect,  than in the 1950s" 
(OLSON  1982,  p.  5]. 
Yet,  already  OIBON  hilnself  relativates the  enpirical  evidence  of his  own 
statement  that  the  Six  enjoyed  rapid  growth,  as  - acx::oniirg  to  OlSON--
only 
11~
11 ,  i.e.  Belgium,  France  arrl  Italy,  am  not  "all"  six  initial 
6  For  ~ive  studies  see  e.g.  CXJ+IISSIOO  OF  'IHE  EXJROPEAN  <nH.JNITIES 
(1977)  and TEUTEMANN  (1988). 3) 
-14-
member countries experie.n::ed ll¥)re  rapid growth over the 1960s than over the 
1950s.  Furthel::Ioore,  a  seccn:i glance at table 1  proves that growth of sane 
Table  1.  Average Annual Rates of Growth of Per Capita Gross 
Domc;:stic  Product at Constant Prices (in  percen~ 
Country  1950-/960  /960-1970  1970-1978 
Australia  2.011  3.7"  2..fc 
Austria  5.7  3.9  3.8 
Belgium  2.0d  4.1  ~.I 
Canada  1.2  3.7  3.1 
Denmark  2.5  3.9  2.2 
Finland  3.3  4.2  2.5 
France  3.5  4.6  3.0 
Germany, Fed.  Rep.  uf  6.6  3.5  2.4 
Ireland  1.8  3.8  2.3c: 
Italy  4.9f  4.6  2.1& 
Japan  6.8h  9.4  3.8 
Netherlands  3.3  4.1  2.3 
New  Zealand  I.7i  2.2J 
_k 
N01way  2.7  4.0  3.9 
Sweden  2.9  3.6  1.2 
Switzerland  2.9  2.8  -0.1 
United  Kingdom  2.3  2.3  2.0 
United  States  1.2  3.0  2.0 
NoTE:  Data  are  from  Yearbook(s)  of National Acrmmt Statistics  for  1969  and  1978, 
Statistical  Office  of the  United  Nations.  New  York,  published  in  1970  and  1979, 
respectively. 
a.  1952-1960;  b.  1963-1970;  c.  1970-1976;  d.  1953-1960; 
e.  1970-1977;  f.  1951-1960;  g.  1970-1977;  h.  1952-1960; 
i.  1954-1960;  j. 1960-1968:  k.  The statistics for New Zealand in this 
period are  not separated from  those  for  "Oceania." 
Source:  OLSON  1982,  p  6. 
other OEXD  countries,  e.g.  the Scanllnavian countries or Japan perfonned as 
well or even better than the econany of the Six. 
&;  table  2  shows,  there was  neither a  significant boost to growth in the 
member countries c:arpared to other in:lustrialized OEX:D  COlll1tries nor was the 
econ::anic  perfo:tlllal're  of the  joinirg countries,  Denmark,  the UK  or Irelard 
1:xx:sted after becxni  n:J  members of the Ccaml.mities.  7 
7  However,  the case of Irelani seems to give eupirical evidence to OLSON's 
h~is:  '!he above  av~e ~  ~o:riDaJX::e in Irelani in the period 
j~tel  v  after acx::ess1.on  may  be J)a]:tlY, exclained bv llnr:>roved  a.cx::ess .  to 
QmaDU.ty markets  ani SUR;X>rtilq  camuru.ty  trans~  HaNever,  the maJor 
dete1:mi.nant  will  have  Deer1  an  excansil"\nA'I"'V  f  policy  (sanetimes 
procyclical) particularly in the :perroa-1975.! 81. -15-
616/1990 
GROSS  DOMESTIC  PRODUCT  AT  CONSTANT  MARKET  PRICES  PER  HEAD  OF  POPULATION 
1960 
1961 
1962 
196! 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1,75 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
EUR6  ( 1) 
1960  •  100 
100.0  100.0 
104.4  102.8 
109.0  107.0 
112.3  111.0 
117.8  116.9 
122.1  121.9 
126.2  127.2 
129.7  1S0.4 
U5.9  136.2 
144.1  141.2 
150.8  l4S.1 
154.4  146.7 
159.4  ISS.! 
167.1  160.4 
170.8  158.6 
168.1  157.0 
176.7  162.7 
181.5  167.8 
186.8  174.2 
193.9  177.5 
197.4  177.7 
197.9  180.0 
198.5  177.0 
200.4  182.0 
205.1  191.3 
209.1  197.5 
213.5  201.5 
217.3  207.9 
224.5  216.0 
251.4  221.8 
DK  IRL 
65.1  64 .s 
68.8  67.8 
72.1  "·  7 
72.0  72.5 
78 .I  74 ·' 
81.0  76.0 
82.5  76.5 
84.6  80.5 
87.5  86.7 
92.6  91.4 
93.7  93.0 
95.5  95.4 
100.0  100.0 
105.0  105.1 
101.6  105.7 
100.6  109.8 
106.9  109.6 
108.3  117.0 
109.5  12S.8 
115.1  125.6 
112.5  128.2 
111.5  130.8 
115.0  IS2 .4 
117.9  131.2 
125.2  U5.9 
128.4  138.7 
132.2  138.2 
131.1  144.9 
130.5  150.4 
131.9  159.5 
A'*'UAL  PERCENTAGE  CHANGE 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
U67 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
4.4 
4.3 
3.1 
4.9 
3.  7 
3.3 
2.8 
4.8 
'.1 
'·' 
2.4 
3.2 
4.8 
2.2 
-1.6 
5.1 
2.7 
2.9 
3.8 
1.8 
.2 
.3 
1.0 
2.3 
2.0 
2.1 
1.8 
3.3 
3.1 
2.8 
4.1 
3.7 
5.S 
4.3 
4.4 
2.5 
4.5 
3.7 
1.4 
2.5 
4.5 
4.7 
-1.1 
-1.0 
3.6 
3.2 
3.8 
1.9 
.1 
1.5 
-1.7 
2.8 
5.1 
3.2 
2.1 
3.1 
3.9 
2.7 
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5.7 
4.8 
-.2 
8.4 
3.7 
1.9 
2.5 
3.4 
5.8 
1.2 
2.0 
4.7 
3.0 
-1.4 
-.9 
6.2 
1.3 
1.2 
3.3 
-.6 
-.9 
3.1 
2.6 
4.4 
4.2 
2.9 
-.8 
-.5 
1.1 
5.5 
2.8 
4.0 
3.3 
1.5 
.6 
5.2 
7.8 
5.4 
1.8 
2.5 
4.9 
3 .I 
2.6 
3.9 
-.2 
6.8 
5.8 
1.4 
2.1 
2.1 
1.2 
-.9 
3.6 
2.0 
-.3 
4.8 
3.8 
6.0 
( 1 )  !  I  DK  GR  E  IRL  P  UK  CH  A  N  S  SF  USA  CON  J  AUS 
EUR9:  1  EUR12  EXCL.  GR  E  P 
( 2) : ;  GR  E  P  CH  A  H  S  SF  USA  CON  J  AUS 
UK  EUR6 
1972  •  100 
76.6 
78.5 
78.6 
81.0 
84.9 
86.4 
87.6 
89.0 
92.2 
93.7 
95.6 
96.9 
100.0 
106.9 
lOS .1 
104.3 
107.2 
109.7 
us.  7 
116.8 
114.0 
112.5 
114.5 
118.5 
120.8 
124.9 
128.9 
134.6 
139.8 
142.7 
2.4 
.1 
3.1 
4.7 
1.9 
1.3 
1.7 
3.6 
1.6 
1.9 
1.4 
3.2 
6.9 
-1.7 
-.8 
2.8 
2.4 
3.6 
2.7 
-2.4 
-1.3 
1.8 
3.5 
1.9 
3.4 
3.2 
4.4 
3.9 
2.0 
62.7 
65.5 
'68.4 
70.5 
7S.9 
76.6 
79 .I 
81.S 
85.2 
90.4 
94.6 
96.9 
100.0 
104.8 
107.1 
105.4 
110.8 
IIS.9 
117.2 
121.6 
123.8 
124.1 
124.5 
125.7 
128.7 
131.2 
133.9 
136.3 
140.8 
145.2 
4.4 
4.3 
3.1 
4.9 
3.7 
3.3 
2.8 
4.8 
6.1 
4.6 
2.4 
3.2 
4.8 
2.2 
-1.6 
5.1 
2.7 
2.9 
3.8 
1.8 
.2 
.3 
1.0 
2.3 
2.0 
2.1 
1.8 
3.3 
3.1 
EUR9  (2) 
65.8 
68.4 
70.6 
72.7 
76.S 
78.8 
81.0 
8S.o 
86.8 
91.2 
94.8 
96.9 
100.0 
105.2 
106.6 
105 .I 
110.0 
112.9 
116.S 
120.4 
121.5 
121.4 
122.3 
124.1 
126.9 
129.8 
132.8 
135.8 
140.4 
144.4 
4.0 
3.3 
3.0 
4.9 
3.2 
2.8 
2.5 
4.5 
5.1 
3.9 
2.2 
S.2 
5.2 
1.3 
-1.4 
4.6 
2.6 
3.0 
3.5 
.9 
-.1 
.7 
1.5 
2.3 
2.3 
2.3 
2.3 
3.3 
2.8 
64.5 
66.3 
69.2 
71.8 
75.7 
79.1 
82.8 
84.9 
88.7 
92.1 
93.3 
95.6 
100.0 
104.5 
103.3 
102.2 
105.9 
109.3 
11S.4 
115.5 
115.7 
117.5 
115 .I 
118.S 
124.6 
128.6 
lSI. I 
135.1 
140.4 
144.2 
2.8 
4.5 
3.7 
5.3 
4.5 
4.7 
2.5 
4.5 
3.8 
1.3 
2.5 
4.6 
4.5 
-1.1 
-1.0 
3.6 
3.2 
3.  7 
1.8 
.2 
1.5 
-2.0 
2.7 
5.4 
3.2 
1.9 
3.0 
3.9 
2.7 
USD 
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A reason for this weak enpirical evid~  might be, that the founding of the 
European  Eoonanic  camunity  an  its later  expansion  were  not  such  sudden 
"breakups of mxiisb.u::i:led  developnents"  as assunai by OLSON.  As  a  matter of 
fact,  the  intemal market  was not catpleted in the early 1960s  - it will 
hopefully  carpleted  in the early 1990s  - am the  joi.ni.n;J  members  of the 
1970s  am  1980s  were  allowed to adjust to the needs  of EEC  policies  over 
several years.  In:ieed,  these  events were  m:re or less a  "smooth  change  in 
institutions"  than  a  "breakup11 •  nte  smooth  cilarge,  however,  gave  public-
choice  effects  the  occasion  to  erode  potential  positive effects  stemming 
fran a  we.akening of interest groups. 
Both,  the  CECCHINI-report  ani the  BERNR:>LZ-paper  focus  on  changes  in the 
situation  of  the  different  actors.  However,  what  will  be  the  effects  of 
institutional changes ani the intemal market progranune on the situation and 
behaviour of different groups within the political decision-making process ? 
3.2.1. The Politicians 
'!here will  be  no  cilarge  in the situation ani behaviour  of those  national 
politicians who  are in cgx:>sition.  '!heir influence ani position within the 
political  process  will  not  be  nuch  affected  by  the  we.akening  of  the 
principle of unanimity,  although they l'lC7II  carmot always blame the goverrnnent 
for  decisions  made  in  Council.  '!hey  may,  in  fact,  lose  sane  influence, 
because  the  situation  for  those  national  politicians  in  power  will  be 
different. 
Although  the  fact  of  a  personal  union  at  national  ani  European  level 
prevents a  cilarge in the distribution of responsibilities fran inpacting on 
irx:tividual  carpetences of the members  of the Council,  the strengthening of 
the principle of majority  (Art.  100  a  EEC  Treaty)  has sanewhat changed the 
irx:tividual  responsibilities  on  both  the  European  ani  the  national  level; 
contrcny  to  the  past,  national  preferences  can  now  be  overruled  in  the 
Council. - 17-
'Ibis ~  of :irrli.vidual  member's  power to let national rent-seeking 
whiches  be  reflected  in EC  directives  is quite interestiig in the plblic 
choice oontext.  On  the one han:i,  it weakens the infll.lel'X'e of an inlividual 
member to run a  national policy, rut em  the other han:i,  the :reai application 
of the majority principle allows the politicians to evade the direct control 
of national  voters  ard direct pressure  by  interest groups  in cases  where 
Council directives are -workirg against national rent-seeking activities. 'Ihe 
reason is that now  the :irrli.vidual member of the Council can use the Council 
itself as a  tool or at least as an alibi.  'lhe :irrli.vidual member can pretelrl 
that he/she struggled hal:d to defeni national  (or particular)  interests, but 
was  overruled by the majority.  Consequently,  the  inpact of national  rent-
seeki.rg activities has been weakened. 
However,  the transition to the new  hanooni.zation approach described in the 
White Paper ard prepared by the European Court of Justice - the principle of 
m.rtual  reoognition  brirgs  national  politicians  ard  national 
administrations urrler further pressure fran interest groups,  especially fran 
those  in iniust.ry.  'Ihe  reason  for this is that,  urrler the  new  rules,  the 
satisfaction  of  national  regulations,  stamards  ard  minimum  requirements 
allows the p:roduoer to serve the whole  internal market without  in'pedinents 
fran national regulations of other member  countries.  If the regulations in 
the  hane  aountry  are  quite  favourable  oc:upared  to those of other partner 
countries,  they will give an c::arpetitive advantage to the hane country ani 
vice versa,  which  looks,  at first glance,  \.Dljustified.  It must,  however, 
first  be  established if different regulations  are  justified by  different 
resource  shortages  at  the  national  level.  If,  for  exanple,  one  country 
awlies higher pollution control regulations because pollution is a  problem 
in that specific aountry,  the Government  only places  a  higher price on  a 
safe envirornnent  because it is in short supply.  If there is a  shortage of 
capital,  capital will beoane toore  expensive,  ard if there is a  shortage of 
safe  envirornnent,  provision  of  a  safe  envirornnent  should  becane  100re 
expensive.  A  less  restrictive  policy  wail.d  :irrli.rectl.y  give  irrlustry  an 
\.Dljustified subsidy in as much  that iniust.ry has not to pay the full price 
for usiig a  resource.  Nevertheless, it is 100re efficient to sperrl additional -18-
resources  on  national  :rent-seekirg to ease am  weaken  national  regulations 
am mininum requirements. 
Finally,  it should  I¥Jt  be  fox:gotten  that  the  inplementation of the White 
Paper is already affectl.rq the different actors am  sectors.  'lherefore,  it 
should be  expected that the  inplementation of the White  Paper itself will 
set the rent-seekirg armies  on the  IOOVe.  Irx::reased  pressure  fran interest 
groups already before 1992  am in the oa.u:se of inplemeriti.rx} the White Paper 
is to be expected.  Are politicians am the administration prepared for this? 
In lookin;J at the  Em:opean  Og:xJsition  (the  Em:opean  Parliament)  it can be 
said that its control  function  has  becane  sanewhat :roore  important as the 
role of Cooncil has becane :roore  important  (am  l'lC7N  :roore  dynamic  due to the 
st.rergt:herljn of the majority rule)  in the fields of social,  environment an:i 
research policy.  FUrt:hel:loore,  the Si.rxjle Em:opean Act an:i the new version of 
Article 149  EEC-Treaty gives the Parliament the CJR)Ortunity to benefit fran 
disagreements within the Council.  Article  149  ~-Treaty lays  down  that a 
prqcsal fran the Cooncil  charged by the Parliament  an:l transmitted to the 
Council  by  the  Chmmi ssion  can  only  be  dlan;Jed  again  or  rejected  by  the 
Cooncil  by  unanimity.  By  this,  the position of the canmi.ssion  an:i  of the 
Parliament within the  field  of forces  is ~.  While  up to nCM  a 
lack of unamity has  led to a  blockade in the integration process,  e.g.  in 
the field of a  <XIlillU'l transport policy,  it can l'lC7N  be used as a  trigger to 
speed  up  the  integration  process.  '!his  will,  however,  result  in  more 
attention an:l perhaps :roore  pressure fran interest groups. 
3.  2.  2.  'Ihe Bureaucrats 
Once  again  a  distin::tion  between  the  national  an1  the  Em:opean  level  is 
necessary. 
'!he bureaucrats at the national level are affected in bJO ways.  On the one 
bani  they  are  directly  addressed  by  the  proposals  of  the  White  Paper - 19-
relatirg  to  plblic  procurement.S  Acx:x>1:dirg  to  these  proposals  bigger 
procurements  have  to  be  advertised  internationally  ani  discrimination 
against foreign 1:.en::)ers is no larger allowed.  On the other harrl,  bureaucrats 
are  affected  insofar as the abolition of  intra-cannunity border controls, 
deregulation  in  sane  sheltered  sectors  ani  hal:m:>nization  of  national 
regulations  may  ren:ler  many  p.lblic  sector  activities  ci:lsolete  at  the 
national  level,  may  reduce  bldgets  ani  may  lead  to  a  loss  of 
responsibilities.  '!his,  of  CXJlll:'Se,  is rot in the  interest of the national 
administrations. 
'!he  European  bureaucrats  (camnission)  ani the national  bureaucrats  on  the 
European  level  (Secretariat of the Council)  will benefit from the shift of 
responsibilities  ani  the  new  hal:m:>nization  ani  sw:veillance  efforts. 
Furthenrore,  the  role  of  the  canmission  has  been  enhanced  by  the  Single 
European Act.  Both these opporbmities will canbine to ensure that European 
bureaucrats will gain increasing attention fran national pressure groups ani 
media.  Are they prepared for this? 
3.  2 • 3.  '!he interest groups 
'!he  situation  for  interest  groups  will  chan:Je  dramatically  as  the  White 
Paper  is  inplemented.  Here  also  different  levels  of  inpact  :nnJSt  be 
distinguished. 
CASE  I  :  Producers 
Let  us  look at first at those  sectors  ani  branches  which  are  explicitly 
mentioned  in  the  White  Paper  :  the  carriers,  the  banking  ani  insurance 
sector,  telecamnunications,  the  professions,  that  part  of  the  service 
sector which  is sheltered by professional  regulations,  i.e.  craftsmen ani 
those sectors which will be affected by the chan:Jes  in public procurement. 
All  these  sectors  are  "threatened"  by  increased  international  competition 
8 It  must  be  borne  in  mi.rn,  hat/ever,  that  P.JPlic  procurement  in  the 
definition of the White  Pa~  covers not only the P.Jb1.ic  sector in tenns 
of national  accounts,  but also the enterprises nm by public authorities 
or controlled by theni. -20-
am by a  dismantlirg of historical privileges. '!he latter may  even result in 
xoore  cx:arpetition  not  only  fran  foreign  but  also  fran  new  danestic 
enterprises.  On  the other harrl,  these cban;Jes  qlei1  up new  opp:>rtunities in 
the markets of other nenber cormtries.  'lhe interest groups will,  of course, 
publicise the "threats" far xoore  tl1an the opp:>rtunities. 
Recent  experience9  with  national  deregulation  in  an  international 
environment yields us two  inportant conclusions  : 
(1)  National pressure groups  struggle very bani to maintain protective am 
discriminatory national regulations as  lon;~ as possible.  So they do this 
to avoid liberalisirg measures which could lead to xoore  cx:arpetition am 
new  cx:arpetitors. 
(2)  National  p:>liticians will be attentive to the  needs am canplaints of 
national interest groups especially in those cases where the risk of job 
losses  is  praninent  am  canplaints  are  fOCUSEd  against  foreign 
cx:arpetitors. 
'lhe  inplementation  of  the  internal  market  programme  am  same  of  the 
deregulation am liberalization measures have to be decided on the European 
level  umer the  system  of majority rule in the  Council.  'lherefore,  it is 
necessa:ry  for  affected interest groups  in different cormtries to press  in 
the  same  direction.  otheiWise it xray  be  inpossible to prevent the Council 
votirg by  xrajority  for  deregulation.  In this  context,  it is ilnportant to 
check whether the respective interests am incentives of interest groups in 
different cormtries are corrlucive to such internationally coordinated action 
am pressure. 
In principle,  an  internationally coordinated pressure is xoore  likely when 
(  1)  third parties  (non-member cormtries' producers)  bear the xrain burden am 
9  In  this  COl'ltext  the  cases  relat~  to  protectionist  measures  in 
cormection  WJ.th  Article  36  EECl'  which  are b~t  before  the  Europeal} 
Q;:Jurt  of  Justice  are  of  interest  :  Gennan  beer,  Gennan  sausages  am 
ItalJ.an  ~  were  sheltered  against  international  canpetitJ.on  by 
protectionist  measures  which  were  judged  by  the  Court  or Justice  as 
J..l'lCCill)atible with Article 36  EECI'. -21-
when,  :furt:henoo:re,  (2)  relative  cutp:::titiveness  positions  within  the 
ccmm.mity  are  not  significantly  affect:.Erl.  so,  it  is  no:re  likely  that 
European  carriers  will  no:re  vigourously  cglOSe  cabotaqe10  allowed  for 
extra-EX::  carriers than  cabotage  allowed  for  intra-EX::  carriers.  Within  the 
canmunity,  carriers in small cnmtries TNOUl.d  prefer cabotage while those in 
lazger cnmtries TNOUl.d  prefer no cabotage to be allowed.11 Consequently,  it 
will  becane  already quite difficult to establish deregulation  in that way 
that cabotage will be  allowed  for  intra-EX:: carriers;  cabotage  allowed  for 
extra-EX:: carriers will not at all be established.  '1his is,  however,  a  stone 
in the wall of a  "Fortress Europe". 
CASE  II :  Trade unions 
Trade unions are organized on a  subnational  level.  In sane countries,  e.g. 
Gennany,  they have a  no:re centralized organization while in other countries, 
e.g.  the UK,  they are no:re  decentralized.  'lhe situation of trade unions is 
not directly affect:.Erl  by  the  internal market  programme.  However,  the  fact 
that crossborder transaction CX>Sts  for capital owners  will be rErluced in a 
sin]le market  may  imply  a  weakenirg  of the  trade  unions'  position.  '!his 
will  be  the  case  particularly  for  trade  unions  in those  cnmtries  where 
labour CX>Sts  (in the broadest sense)  are quite high,  while the position of 
unions  in  countries  with  quite  low  labour  CX>Sts  will  be  st.ren]thened 
vis-a-vis  the  other  trade  unions,  l:ut  still  weakened  vis-a-vis  capital 
owners.  'Iherefo:re,  it could  be  helpful  for  trade  unions  as  a  whole  to 
intensify  crossborder  co-operation  or  even  merge,  at  least  on  the 
(sub)national  level.  '!he  incentives  to  do  so  are,  however,  quite  weak. 
International co-operation or subnational mergers will - if this is finally 
institutionalized  - lead to a  loss of power am  scope  for action  for the 
managers  of  unions'  affect:.Erl.  F\lrthet:loo:re,  unions  in  low  labour  cost 
countries may  try to use their relatively low labour CX>Sts  to attract nore 
job-creatinj capital.  ConseqUently,  an  initial overall  weakenirg of trade 
unions can be expected as a  result of the Internal. Market. 
10 cabotage  :=  fulfillin]  freiCiht  orders  which  are  limited  to  a  country 
different fran the coofttry or  the carrier. 
11 '1hese  different  situations  am  interest structures will  be  once  again 
dj salSSed in the context of the likelihood of the "Fortress Europe". 4) 
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CASE  III :  Iatent groups 
Bearirg  in  :mini  that  international  co-operation  cnoorg  groups  with  common 
goals is toore  likely than co-operation cnoorg  groups with conflictirg goals, 
one  could  roN  expect  that  the  influence  of  consumers,  tax  payers  or 
ecological  pressure  groups  will  rise,  as  different national  organizations 
aim  at the  same  goal  arrl  attack thin:l parties,  e.g.  producers.  ~us, the 
likelihood  of  internationally  coordinated  action  might  seem  quite  high. 
HCMeVer,  the problem of organization constraints for these latent groups has 
also to be bonte in :mi.n:l.  Some  of these groups are not even organized on a 
national level.  So powerful  and pennanent international action is even less 
likely. 'lhese latent groups may,  therefore,  even lose influence. 
3.2.4. '!he voters 
'!he voters' situation remains alioost unaffected although they could benefit 
fran the canpletion of the c:::anm:m  market as consumers;  citizens may  realize 
that there will be no toore  intra-~ border controls arrl that the supply of 
goods and services will be toore various.  However,  neither their influence on 
the outpit of the integration process nor their influence on the financing 
of  the  integration  policies  will  be  changed.  It  will  remain  at  best 
marginal,  although  the  control  function  of  the  European  Parliament, 
European citizens vote for,  will becane saoowhat toore  inp:>rtant. 
Nevertheless,  it will  still  be  the  Council  who  decides  what  has  to  be 
tackled  and  horN  it has to be  financ:ed  (see figure 1).  In contradiction to 
the marketplace where the consumer directly decides which product he needs 
and  horN  much  of his budget he will and can  sperrl the no:nnal  {sub) national 
public  provision  of  goods  is  realized  only  irrlirectly  bY  electing  a 
government which fills the "basket" of goods and services publicly provided. 
On  the European  level the irrlividual voter has not even the power to elect 
the European government which decides upon the European policy "basket"  {see 
figure  1).  'Ibis  further  marginalization  of  the  European  voter  is  not 
alleviated,  neither  by  the  internal  market  programme  nor  by  the  Single -23-
European Act.  For this reason,  the voters'  irx::entives within the political 
decision-mak:irg  pxooess  will  not  be  c:harged  significantly.  Consequently, 
they  will  remain  ratiooal.ly  uninfonoed  am  "ratiooal.ly  ignorant••  about 
European affairs; they will sinply hq:)e to benefit fran the internal market 
p:rogramne wit:hcut really tryin;J to influerx::e this progranme.  In other words, 
national politicians· within the Coon::il  can continue their policies without 
bein;J bothered by voters. 
rigum 1  :  'lbe role of the voter in the institutional structure of the 
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In future,  there will be a  lot of policy issues prepared am decided at the 
European level.  'lherefo:re,  the media have to focus D:):re  of their resources 
on  the  European  integration  process.  It is possible that the  media  will 
evolve into a  control fulrtion similar to that which they now  fulfil on the -24-
(sub) national level.  lfatlever,  their power at the European level will remain 
restricted because  of their limited ability to influence voters'  attitude 
since the voter still scarcely matters on the European level.  Nevertheless, 
there  may  be  scue  cgx>rtunity  for  the  naiia  to  use  IOOral  suasion  to 
influence the attitude of European politicians am bureaucrats. 
3.  4.  S(l+fARY 
In surrmariz~ this chapter we  can say 
(1)  Neither the intemal market programme  nor the  S~le  European Act will 
c.harge the situation of the voter or that of the national Opposition.  'Ihe 
role of the  European  Opposition  (European  Parliament)  will be  enhanced 
irrlirectly, due to its 100re  ilrportant control function. 
(2)  Politicians  in  power  will  have  100re  roan  for  manoeuvre  vis-a-vis 
national  parliaments  am  national  pressure  groups  due  to  the 
strengthenirg of the majority rule.  F\nthenoore,  this rule will  ilnpact 
negatively also on their capability to inplement EC  directives favouring 
specific national rent-see.ki.nj activities within the European integration 
process. 
(3)  As  far  as  bureaucrats  are  concerned  there  will  be  a  shift  of 
responsibilities  in  favour  of  the  bureaucrats  at  the  European  level 
(  Ccmnission am Secretariat of the Council) • 
(4)  Interest  groups  will  be  faced  with  a  nea:6Sity  for  greater 
international  oo-operation.  Well-ozganized  interest  groups  may  benefit 
fran this need;  groups with conflictirg interests am latent groups will 
becane less influential. 
(5)  '!he  principle  of  mutual  recognition  will  make  national  rent-seeking 
activities IOO:re  attractive. -25-
4.  LIKELY  cxm::x:ME  OF  'IHE  INl'ERNAL MARKEr  PRCXiRAMME 
Taking  into  acx:xJUnt  the  c:!lamed  structure  within  the  political 
decision-~  process,  the  iniividual  incentive  stnlcture  ani  the 
incentive  structure  produced  by  the  institutionalised  system,  one  may 
speculate  on  the likely outcane of the political process at both national 
and  European  levels.  'Ihe  followi.rg  paragra.Jils  cxmsider the likely outcome, 
i.e.  the  performance  of the plblic sector ani political  ani bureaucratic 
interventions into the market process ani the influence of interest groups. 
4 .1.  'IHE  OONTAINMENI'  OF  'IHE  RISE OF  'IHE  RJBLIC SECroR 
'!he  authors  of  the  CECCHINI -report ani  BERNHOI.Z  expect that the  share  of 
national resources required by the plblic sector will be reduced as a  result 
of  the  internal  market  progranune.  While  the  CECCHINI-study  bases  its 
assessments  on  the  assunptions that the abolition of crossborder controls 
and  price  reductions  of  bidders  in  the  field  of plblic procurement  will 
reduce input resources,  BERNHOI.Z  is quite optimistic that a  rollback of the 
public sector will emerge due to international c:atrpetition among  governments 
in favour of less restrictive regulations,  lower tax burdens,  etc.  However, 
public choice theory does not necessarily support these views.  Consider the 
following  : 
(  1)  Bureaucrats  try  to  increase  their  budget  ani  to  st.ren;Jthen  their 
influence  on  the  decision-~ process.  Personal  costs  am  budget 
reductions  may  be  possible  in  principle  due  to  the  abolition  of 
crossborder controls, but the administration will try to hinder this.  For 
exanple,  compensating  national  regulations,  e.g.  ITOre  sophisticated 
national  statistics  or  controls  might  be  established  in  place  of 
international  controls.  Furthenoore,  there  may  even  be  an  overall 
increase in resources consumed due to a  new or exparrled administration at 
the  European  level,  e.g.  a  European  police,  a  European  body  for 
supervising public procurement regulations. -26-
(2)  As  for cost reductions to the public  sector due  to the  opening up of 
public prc:x::urene1t,  the CECCHINI -report expects corresporx:linJ reductions 
of bldgets an:i bldget deficits  (EMERSON  EI' AL  1989,  p.160).  However,  this 
would  conflict  with  the  goals  of  bureaucrats.  '!hey  nonnally  tl:y  to 
exhaust their bldget  fully  so as to avoid  a  reduction  in their budget 
limit.  A  reduction  of  inplt  prices  - if it occurs  at  all  - will, 
therefore,  present  the  bureaucrats  with  a  new  challerge,  i.e.  how  to 
spen:i the bldgetary resources released after ccmpletion of the internal 
market  !  So it is not unlikely that they will not only buy 10 units of a 
good  but  11  if  they  can  get  the  extra  unit  at  the  same  price. 
F\lrt:he:noore,  it might happen that a  cheaper foreign product will not be 
p.rrchased.  '!here  are sane  incentives to favour danestic provision,  e.g. 
the  pressure  of  danestic  an:i  local  producers  an:i  lobby  groups  on  the 
administration an:i politicians.  To  avoid this risk,  a  European body  for 
ex-post  transparency  an:i  sw:veillance  is already planned,  implying more 
rather than less bureaucracy.  Furthenwre,  administrations who  prefer the 
sanewhat 100re  expansive domestic product to the cheaper  foreign product 
will  not be  exposed  to  sanctions,  neither to domestic  nor to European 
ones. 
( 3)  International  competition between national tax systems exists.  In some 
countries,  recent tax  law  refonns  were  combined  with  a  rollback of the 
public sector/GOP ratio  (e.g.  in Gennany  an:i  in the UK).  However,  it is 
l.DlCertain,  whether this rollback of the public sector was more the result 
of  an  international  c:::aJll)etition  aiOOng  governments,  or  simply  national 
governments  i.n:ieperrlently rationalising public allocation,  stabilization 
an:i  redistribution activities.  It may  even  have  been  a  combination  of 
both.  Irrleed,  BERNHOLZ  explains the change in policy in the UK,  the USA, 
etc. not by increased competition but by the wish to reverse the negative 
econanic  i.Irpacts  of  public  sector  growth  (BERNHOLZ  1989,  p.  19ff). 
F\lrt:he:noore,  the  verbal  justification  of  tax-law  changes  arrl  the 
roll-back  of  the  public  sector  in  Gennany  arrl  in  the  UK  referred  to 
"overdoing" an:i not to international competition. -27-
Increased cetupetition will not necessarily lead to a  roll-back of the public 
sector.  On  the contrary,  it can even lead to a  larger plblic sector fuelled 
by  international  carpetition  for  higher  subsidies12,  as  in  the  Federal 
~lie  of Gemany,  where the r.amer am even the nmrl.cipalities ca:rpete to 
attract capital  by  offer:irxj  subsidies,  cheap  lam,  etc.  'lhese  direct ani 
iniirect subsidies ~d  have  to be  financed  by the latent groups  of the 
econany,  e.g. by increasi.rg iniirect taxation. 
4.  2.  'lHE  INFII.JENCE  OF  INTERESl' GRaJPS  AND  "FO.RIRESS  EUROPE" 
As regards the influence of interest groups three different situations have 
to be  distin:Juj.shed:  (1)  the  case  of national  rent--see.k:ilg  activities  as 
regards  national  mininum  stan::1ards,  (2)  the  case  of  protection  against 
intra-~  CXJLupetitors  ani  (3)  the  case  of  protection  against  extra-EC 
CClll"peti tors. 
4.  2 .1. Mi.ninum stan::1ards ani national rent--see.k:ilg activities 
National  rent--see.k:ilg activities yield :mre after the inplementation of the 
principle  of  nutual  recognition  of  national  stan::1ards.  Consequently, 
national  interest  groups,  i.e.  producer  groups  will  struggle  for  less 
demamin:;J  stan::1ards  on  the  national  level  if  this  is  combined  with  a 
reduction of production costs or other rEgUlations 'WOrkirg  as impediments to 
innovation ani profits. 'Ibis will hold for all camtries; producers of those 
countries which have the less de.marnin;J  mininum requireJrents will,  how~ver, 
at least ten"p:>rarily benefit fran this CXIl'paiCltive  advantage.  Consequently, 
there will  be  caupetition to reduce  cost ani carpetition-relevant minimum 
requireJrents,  e.g.  in the  banki.rg  sector,  bit also  in the  manufacturing 
sector ani services like transportation ani teleocmt'lDli.cation. 
European ani national politicians ani bureaucrats will be prepared to foster 
a  convergence of mininum requirements similar to the least d.emardiig in one 
of the  European  coontries.  '!his will not be  hi.mered by those groups,  at 
12  'Ibis risk is clearly also seen by  BERNHOI..Z.  ~  may  be the reason  why 
he does not allow any subsidization in his scenar1.o (BERNHOI..Z  1989, p.  ~6f) • -28-
present benefitin;J  fran  higher  stan:3ards  as  they  are -worse  organized  am 
arrl less powerful as a  consequence of organization pniJlems.  However,  these 
groups  might  pezi1aps  benefit  fran  increased  c:xarpetition,  i.e.  cost 
reductions as a  result of less ciemaniirq mininum requirements might lead to 
price reductialS. 
4.  2.  2.  Protection against intra-EX: cuupetito:rs 
'!he  intemal market  programme  follows  the  cq;proadl  given  by  the  European 
cant of Justice,  e.g.  in the cases dealin;J with the protection of German 
beer brewers ard sausage producers or Italian pasta producers.  '!he  internal 
market  prograitm!  is in a  way  a  programme  to reduce the negative  impact of 
interest groups as regards their successful struggle for protection against 
intra-EX:  c:catpetito:rs.  '!he  main  goal  of the pnxJrall1llle  is to abJlish or at 
least to :roll  back  inpediments to the  four  freedats  of the EEC-Treaty  by 
operationalizin;J  at  least  sane  of  the  measures  to  reach  these  freedans. 
'Ihese  inpediments,  however,  are  national  protectionist  :regulations,  not 
ecx>nani.cally justified am,  consequently,  the outcane of government failure. 
As  a  result of the Sin;Jle European Act Council decisions in favour of toore 
intra-EX: <XIlpetition normally need only an ~  by majority.  'Ibis means 
for national  interest groups that it will no  lOB:Jer  be enough to persuade 
one  government to block such a  decision but there is the need to persuade 
several  govermnents.  'Ibis,  however,  will  becxme  difficult  if goals  of 
in:lividual national interest groups differ. 
'lherefore, it can be expected that the negative inpact of interest groups on 
intra-camunity  c:catpetition  ard  freedan of settlement will  be  reduced.  At 
least in cases where  national  protection differs  fran  c::nmt.ry  to c::nmt.ry, 
i.e.  starti.n:J  positions  are different,  a  breakup  of these  protections  is 
likely.  '!he liberalization of capital markets ard of the transport markets 
may  seiVe  as  exanples.  '!he  weakenirg  of  interest groups'  influence  cxmes 
fran the fact that national interest groups,  even if they belOB:J to the same 
branch  or  sector  have  sanetimes  oonflictinj  interests.  '!he  case  of  the 
transport  sector  was  mentioned  in this  context:  while  big  CO\mtries'  or 
transit  CO\mtries'  carriers  will  qlt against  cabotage  ard  other  market--29-
entry deregulations  small  am  peripheral countries'  carriers will struggle 
for  deregulation  as  this will  allow  them  to operate  on  other  interesti.rg 
markets. 
However,  in  sane  fields  interest  groups  have  already  been  sucx::essful  in 
slowinJ  down  the  process  of  deregulation  as  they  influenced  the  internal 
market  programne  am  the  si.rgle  Eurpoean  Act  itself.  As  regards  liberal 
professions  deregulat~ Council  directives  with  respect  to  trai.ninJ  am 
corxtitions  of  acx::ess  for  natural  persons  have to be approved by unanimity 
(see Article  16  of the Si.rgle  European  Act) •  Consequently,  national  rent-
seekirg  activities  in this  field  are still as  pranising  as  in the past. 
Nevertheless,  in  general  a  weakening  of  the  negative  impact  of  interest 
groups as regards intra-EC ccarpetition is to be expected. 
4.2.3.  Protection against extra-EC carpetitors - Fortress Europe 
Non-European  competitors  increasi.rgly  fear  that  liberalization  of markets 
within the EC  will lead to greater protectionism vis-a-vis third countries. 
What  is the  likelihood  that  these  fears  of  a  "Fortress  Europe"  will  be 
justified ? 
In many  cases  imports  of  goods  am  services  fran  third  countries  to the 
community  receive  discriminato:r.y  treabnent  canpared  with  intra-EC  flows. 
'!here are two major sources of increased protectionism after 1992.  Firstly, 
there will be  a  need  for charges in rules in cases where  we  have different 
bilateral  trade  regimes  within  different  mel1lber  countries,  e.g.  under 
Article  115  EEC-Treaty.  Secom,  the  exposure to DDre  intra-EC  competition 
lets interest groups struggle for higher extra-EC protection. 
As regards the first source for increased protection the argumentation is as 
follows:  for exanple,  while there are no constraints for imports of Japanese 
cars to Gennany,  other countries apply quota  systems.  As table 3  shows  for 
1982/83 there were  "only"  50 products affected by import restrictions urrler 
Article  115  of the  EEC  Treaty  in  Gennany  while  there  were  100re  than  500 
products burdened by import restrictions in France am Italy. -30-
As  the  intemal market  prograti.IDe  does  not provide  for differential treat-
ment  of  i.nports  fran  non-member  CO\D'lt.ries  in different member  states,  the 
question arises whether a  unifonn trade re;i.me  for the Q-mm.mity will terrl 
towards higher  (Fran::e,  Italy)  or lower  (Gennany)  levels of protectionism. 
Import  restrictions 
urrler Article 115 EEC 
Treaty  ani  anti-
dunpin;  procedures 
are  nonnally 
inplemented  on  the 
initiative  of 
well-organized 
interest  groups 
represent:irg danestic 
producers' 
greater 
against 
seek:irg 
protection 
cx:upetitors 
fran third CO\D'lt.ries. 
As  can  be  seen  fran 
table  3,  interest 
groups  in Fran::e  anj 
Italy,  b.It  also  in 
the  UK,  Greece  am 
Belgium  TNere 
Table  3:  Import Restrictions in the EC in 1982-83 
Under Article 115 of the EEC Treaty1 
(Number of affected products)2 
Product 
Textiles and clothing3  Others~  Total 
Belgium/Luxembourg  162  70  232 
Denmark  56  51  107 
France  208  340  548 
Germany. Federal 
Republic of  36  II  47 
Greece  6  247  253 
Ireland  64  98  162 
Italy  107  4.59  566 
United Kingdom  278  8  286 
Source:  D.  Witteler, "Tarifare und  nichttarifare Handelshemm-
nisse in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland-Ausmass und Ursachen, ·· 
Die  W~ltwirtsclwft (Ti.ibingen),  No.  I (1986). p.  142. 
1 Anicle  11.5  of the  EEC  Treaty  allows  member  countries  to 
impose  national restrictions against  impons  from  third  countries 
under cenain circumstances. 
1 Product lines of trade statistics. 
3 Against Multifiber Arrangement countries. 
4  Excluding state-trading countries. 
significantly m:>re  Scm:pe:  LIPSCHITZ  et al.  1989 
Sl.l<X2SSful  in realiz:irg their part.irul.ar interests than interest groups  in 
GenDany or Denmark. 
However,  is it likely that the power of interest groups,  especially those 
in  Fran::e  ani  Italy  will  be  so  significantly  "Weakened  by  the  internal 
market progrmtlne that there will be no pressure for a  "Fortress Europe"  fran 
this side? ihe answer nust be No!  As already mentioned earlier,  a  weaken:irg 
of interest groups can only be expected in those cases,  where the shift of 
resp>nsibilities  to  the  European  level  am  the  sucx:essful  struggle  for -31-
protectionist measures  to be  inplemented  on this level  require  (1)  on the 
one hard a  concerted action of interest groups of different countries while 
(2)  on  the  other hard the  implementation of  such measures  is resisted by 
opposition,  either fran within the group or fran a  third group.  It may  be 
true  that  a  widenirg  of  bilateral  inport  restrictions  with  EC-wide 
restrictions c:ieman:1s  internationally concerted action. However,  there are no 
countervaili:rg  conflicts  between  interest  groups  of different  countries, 
e.g.  Italian  car  producers  are  interested  in  reduced  CX~t"petition  from 
Japanese car producers,  but so are German car p:roducers.13 
What  will  be  the  likely  reaction  of  politicians  ani  bureaucrats  to 
increasi:rg  pressure  for  greater  protection  ?  A  Fortress  Europe  will  not 
emerge  if politicians ani bureaucrats sucx:essfully resist this pressure.  To 
do  so,  they  need  additional  S\JR)Ort  either  fran  the  intenlal  market 
programme or fran sanewhere else.  As regards the intenlal market programme, 
it does not give additional incentives to politicians ani the administration 
to  face  the  pressure.  F\lrthenoore,  foreign  cuupetitors  directly  am 
negatively affected by  c:ieman:1s  for protection are not clients of European 
politicians, ani European consumers  (e.g.  car buyers)  do not participate in 
the decision-makin;J procedure.  So there will be a  ten:iency to  (ten"porarily) 
widen  narrow  inport  restrictions  to  EC-wide  restrictions.  Only  in  cases 
where  non-member  countries'  producers  get  the  strorg  SURX>rt  of  their 
government,  bargaini.rg  between  powerful  non-member  governments  ani  the 
Council might alleviate the risk of a  "Fortress Europe";  i.e. the fortress 
will only be avoided if the Council is exposed to heavy external pressure. 
A  secorxi  source of increase in protectionism comes  fran another element of 
the  intenlal  market  programme.  Liberalization of markets will  expose  sane 
services  in  different  countries  leaciin']  to  greater  canpetition  in  those 
countries,  e.g.  in the  field of bankir:g am  insurance services or carrier 
services.  'lberefore,  the affected groups may  ask for <:XI'l'pE!llSati:rg  extra-EC 
protection,  as  was  dj  srussed  urxier the  "rec:ip:rocity"  item  for the bankir:g 
13  German  car producers,  however,  CXJUl.d  remain  in the back  stage of this 
struqqle for a  ~ide  inport restriction because they can assume that 
FrenCfi  am  Italian  p:rociucers  will  create  the  necessary ~  am 
because German intereSts in foreign markets are relatively toore illlportant. -32-
ard  insurance  system.  As  such  efforts  are  fOCUSEd  against  third  counb:y 
cuupetito:rs,  they may  be SlJRX>rted  by pressure groups  fran other countries 
ard thus may  be llD:re  readily acx:epted by politicians ard bureaucrats. 
All in all, the internal market progranme is unlikely to prevent a  terrlency 
towards  a  Fortress  Europe,  i.e.  higher  extra-EC  protection,  while  the 
necessary charge in regulations will :reinforce protectionist pressures. 
4.  3.  SCME  EVIDENCE 
One  could rDW  argue that this is a  too pessimistic view concenring public-
choice  processes  which  erode  the  advantages  of the  internal  market  right 
fran  the  begi.nnin;J.  It could  be  stressed that the  fonnation  of  pov~erful 
interest groups  on  a  European  level  takes  time  ard that deregulation will 
take  place  before  European  interest  groups  will  have  been  organized 
adequately.  But  in  how  far  do  these  hopes mirror actual  developnents?  'Ib 
deal with these arguments let us look for sane evidence. 
If  plblic-choice  processes  were  important  despite  the  internal  market 
progranme one would e.g. expect 
- significant  delays  for  those  deregulations  which  increase  international 
ooopetition,  namely  extra-EC  ooopetition  ard  which  reduce  inten"lational 
protection  as  catpared  to  those  deregulations  which  e.g.  reduce  cost-
relevant :m:i.niim.nn  requirements ard 
- significant delays  for those directives,  mentioned  in the white  book  of 
1985,  which  reduce  the  roan  for  maneuv:re  ard  degrees  of  freedan  for 
national  politicians  (namely  the  power  to  tax)  ard  bureaucrats  (e.g. 
control  rights  or  plblic  proc::urenent)  as  carpared  to  those  directives 
which  hantarlze  administrative procedures  without affecting politicians' 
ard bureaucrats' b.ldgets ard ccrnpetences. 
If plblic-choice processes were,  however,  not eroclirg the advantages of the 
internal  market  right  fran  the  begi.nnin;J  no  significant time  lags  in the -33-
adopotion  am  inplementation  of plblic-choice  sensitive am  not sensitive 
directives l¥all.d to be expected. 
An  analysis  of  the  different  EC-<Drmission's  :reports  ''~  the 
inplementation of the White Paper on the Q:mpletion of the Intema1 Market" 
irx:licates,  however,  that there seems to be  inieecl a  significant difference 
between  how  the  Cc:mK::il  deals  with  plblic-choice  sensitive  camdssion's 
proposals  am  how  it adc¢s  directives  not  stron.Jly  affected  by  plblic-
dloice processes: 
-Although the achieven&lt of the internal market should lead in practice to 
the di~  of Article 115  of the EEC-Treaty  ("national cxmnercial 
policy measures")  there are still :mre than 100 national measures accepted 
by the  Ccmnission  each year,  which  allow national  authorities to reduce 
oatpetition  fran  extra-EC  countries  by  limiti.rg  respective  extra-EC 
inports. 
- No  progress  can be  :reoorded as  regan3s  hanoonization or co-operation  in 
the  field  of  taxation.  Several  proposals  of  the  Ccmnission  had  to  be 
wit.Mrawn  as  the  Cc:mK::il  was  not  willi.rg  to  a<::Dept  ~- No  proposal 
related  to  the  hanoonization  of  irx:lirect  taxation . has  yet  passed  EC-
legislation although 15 out of 1S  proposals related to this subject am at 
present on the Cc:mK::il  table date fran before 19S5. 
- Also the adoption of directives a:imir~J at free DDVemerit  for labour am the 
professions am at a  CCil1llDl1 market for services has beeri delayed by two or 
:mre  years.  '!he  main  ·bulk  of  these  proposals  was  - aexx>rtlinj  to  the 
original  timetable  of the  White  Paper  - foreseen to be  adopted by the 
Council in the CXJUJ:."Se  of the 19S7  iss period.  But many  of them were adopted 
not earlier than in erd-19S9 or are not yet adopted.  '!his holds especially 
for those  fields  intensively regulated at the national  level,  e.g.  road 
transport.  Namely  in  these  fields  the  time-span  between  the  date  of  a 
respective  Ccmni.ssion  proposal am  the  final  adoption by  the  Cc:mK::il  is 
ext:renel.y lorg. -34-
Furt.henoo:re,  it has to be bo:me  in mini that directives JOOSt  sensitive to 
plblic-choice  p:ooesses  are  subject  to  an  unaninrAls  adoption  by  the 
Cool'r=il.  '!his  procedure,  however,  significantly  prolorgates  the  final 
decision-makirg process in the Coo!'r=il. 
4.4.  stHmRY 
In  chapter  four  -we  had  to  :realize  that  sane  hopes  related  with  the 
inplementation of the intemal market progranme do mt consider the effects 
of plblic-choice p:ooesses.  '!he in=entive structure am the likely behaviour 
of bureaucrats ten:! to urdennine the hopes of BERNHOLZ  am  the arguments of 
the  CEXXmNI  -report that there will be a  welfare increasirg effect after 
1992  fran  a  :rollback  of  the  plblic  sector  .14  Already  BERtH>LZ  himself 
introduoes  several  caveats inii.catin:j the evidence of severe risks ~ 
fran plblic-choice effects  [BERNHOLZ  1989, p.  37ff] • 
Nevertheless,  enpirical  evidence  exists  for  a  :rollback  of  the  plblic 
sector/GOP  ratio am  for an  intemational  ten:lency to reduce marginal  tax 
rates.  As this holds,  however,  mt only for sane EC-c:xJUlltries  but also for 
l'lOn-men'i:ler CXAllltries,  as e.g. the United states, Japan or Austria this might 
not  be  the  result  of  the  intemal  market  p:rogranme  but  it might  be  a 
reaction on ove.nioirg in the past. 
As  regards the influence of interest groups -we ~  between their 
inpact on  (1)  national mi.ninum  requirements,  on  (2)  intra-EC CXllpatition ani 
on  (3)  extra-EC curpetition.  Public choice am  errpirical evidence  inii.cate 
that there oculd be,  imeed,  a  ten:lency to reduce mi.ninum  requirements ani 
to  increase  intra-EC  curpetition.  However,  there  is  also  a  ten:lency  to 
increase extra-EC protection,  discussed under the item "Fortress Europe". 
14 If there  is finally  an  unavoidable  reduction  of the PUblic sector,  it 
micmt  mainly cane fran a  reduction of PUblic  investmerit  ~ture, as 
cuts in infrastructural. investments do not hurt that soon am tllat obviously. -35-
5.  REilJCING 'IHE  RISKS  OF  INEFFICIENCIES 
So  far,  we  have  seen that there is only little reascn to assume that the 
inpact of interest groups on the p!blic provision process will be oontained 
or even  redllCed  by the intemal market p:rognmme  or by the Sirgle European 
Act.  F'Urtherloo:re,  it is unlikely that the intemal market p:rognmme will be 
ac:x:x:upanied  by a  significant decline in the p!blic sector share of output. 
'lhe:refo:re,  the  means  by  which  the  negative  inpacts  of  a  growirg  plblic 
sector am of the increasirq influence of interest groups can be alleviated 
now  needs to be examined. 
To  deal with this issue it is necessary to look once again at the reasons 
for the negative inpact of interest groups am for government failures. 
5 .1.  'IHE  NEX;ATIVE IMPAcr OF  INI'EREST GEUJPS 
'!he  key  question  of  this  paragrcqil  is,  how  the  negative  influence  of 
pressure  groups  can  be  reduced  am  which  elements  of the  decision-~ 
process should be inproved.  To answer this question it is ~,  to look 
at the detenninants of the rather negative inpact of interest groups. 
Why  do interest groups have a  negative rather than a  positive effect on the 
political decision-~  process? Why  is rent-seekirg not a  pareto-optilnal 
process,  i.e. groups benefitirg fran rent-seekirg activities have to pay-out 
those who  are burdened by these activities? An  examination of rent-seekirg 
processes gives us an answer to these questions. 
Rent-seekirg is not a  bal:ga~ process  between  those  groups  who want to 
increase their profits am those who are burdened,  e.g. via higher taxes or 
higher prices.  It is a  bal:ga~ process  between  those who  initiate this 
process  am  a  third  group who  also hopes  to benefit,  e.g.  cx:mpetitors  or 
politicians.  '!he  burdened  group  does  not  participate  or  is not  powerful 
enough  to  influence  the  bal:ga~ process.  So  ll&iSUreS  discriminatirg 
extra-EC cx:mpetitors are not bal:gained between EC-producers am EC-concumers 
or extra-EC canpetitors bJ:t nonnally between EC-producers am EC-bureaucrats -36-
an:i politicians.  '!he result of such inefficient bargairrl.n] prcx:esses might 
be  that  the  aalitional  benefit of the  bargairrl.n]  groups  is minor  to the 
b.n:den put an the shoulders of not participatirg groups. 
'!his  answer  leads,  however,  to a  further set of questions:  Why  do  groups 
potentially burdened not participate in these rent-seekirg bargai.nirgs? Why 
are they less powerful than potential beneficiaries of such activities? '!he 
answer,  already given in chapter 2.3  unier the  item  "low-benefit problem" 
was  that  there  is an  asymmetry  in ozganizin:.J  pressure  groups  an:i  in the 
influence  of  interest  groups  on  politicians  am  tureaucrats.  '!he  IOOSt 
p:ressin:.J  groups  are  groups  where  the  potential  gain  fran  rent-seeld.n] 
represents  a  substantial proportion of their nanbers'  budget.  '1hese  groups 
tern to be better ozganized than other groups am  are extremely interested 
in havirg influence an politicians.  car producers an:i car users might serve 
as  an  exanple.  '!he  in:tividual  car user  buys  a  new  car every  five or ten 
years.  So it will have only relative little consequence for his budget if a 
lack  of  c:::arpetitian  as  a  result  of  cartellization  or  market-entcy 
constraints  for  Japanese  an:i  other extra-EC  producers  has  led to a  price 
increase of, let's say 10%  as cc::arpared to a  canpetitive market.  '!his is only 
very little as c:x:arpared to his ten-years budget an:i as c:x:arpared to what such 
a  price  increase means  for the producer.  Consequently,  car users are less 
present to hin:ler rent-seekirg activities of car producers. 
While  this  partly  explains  the  asynmetcy  in  the  participation  of  rent-
seeld.n] bargairrl.n] it does not explain why  the IOOSt  influential groups are 
not representirg big groups but often only small groups.  Why  do small groups 
of producers have too:re  influence on the political decisian-Illa1d.nj process on 
all  levels,  includirg  the  E.\lropean  one,  than  small  groups  of,  e.g. 
oonsumers?  In  other  words:  why  have  sane  groups  to  be  very  big  before 
beccming  influential while  others do  not need to be  big? Am why  has  the 
dlainnan  of  e.g.  Dlimler  Benz  or  Deutsche  Bank  too:re  influence  on  Gennan 
politicians than the chainnan of a  small or medium  enterprise? 'IWo  reasons 
shall  be  mentioned  here.  One  is,  that  because of the  low-benefit  problem 
sane groups' members do not press as hard as other groups'  members do.  While -37-
e.g.  car producers have only to plSh in the field where the car market is 
affected consumers have to follow ani plSh on all markets. 
'!he  other  reason  to be mentiooed  here is that "small  men's"  groups  count 
less  in  tenns  of  their  ability  to  infl\lei'X:e  reelection  chances  for 
politicians.  While  members  of oonsumer  organizations  can  only  "threat"  to 
infl\lei'X:e  the  votirg  behaviour  of  their  friems  ani  family  members, 
entrepreneurs  are  - at  least  in  the  eyes  of  politicians  - also 
representants of their staff ani they can by this "threat" to influence the 
votfn1 behaviour of their enployees ani their friems ani  family  members. 
Entrepreneurs might argue that a  measure which is in favour of an enterprise 
is also  in  favour  of its arployees  While  a  measure  or  a  situation  (e.g. 
strorg cxupetition)  which is bad for the profit of an entrepreneur is also 
bad  for  the  enployees.  So  the  nnnber  of  members  of  an  entrepreneurial 
pressfn1 group is in the eyes of politicians also corrected ani increased by 
the mnnber of affected lNOrkers  while no correction is made  in cases of e.g. 
consumer groups. 
After havfn1 clarified these i.Jrportant aspects of rent-seek:i.rg processes am 
the  reason  for  the  bias  of  activities  in  favour  of  small  ani  well-
organized  groups  we  can  now  look  for  cxxmtenneasures  to  reduce  such  a 
negative inpact. 
A  three-fold  strategy  might  allow  a  reduction  in the  negative  inpact  of 
pressure  groups.  Firstly,  interest  groups'  biased  influence  has  to  be 
weakened  by  buildirg  up  institutionalized  counter-influences.  Secord, 
greater transparency  in the whole decision-maki.rg process ani the buildirg 
up  non-institutional  CXJUl'lter-influenoes  within  the  system  is  needed. 
Finally,  the  intensity of plblic interventions into markets without market 
failures has to be limitted by institutional means. 
(1)  A  systematic  introduction of all affected interest groups  ani sectors 
into the decision-tnakinj process  may  inprove the outoane of the political 
process.  '!he theory of externalities may  be helpful in this context,  i.e. to 
look systematically for effects am side effects (externalities)  of measures -38-
ani  intel.ventions  urder  consideration.  So  it OJUld  be  toore  efficient not 
only to hear the view of danestic prcxiucers on antidunpirg laws,  but also to 
hear how danestic clients am consumers  'WOUld  rate the :illpacts of an anti-
dunpirg  law.  'lhis  consideration of,  e.g.  the consumers'  viewpoint  should, 
however,  be  instituionalized  ani  not  heard  a.lJoost  accidentally,  as  at 
present.  'lhus,  the systematic participation of all interest groups  in the 
decision-makirg  process  can  be  ensured ani all relevant  informations will 
similarly be systematically made available to the administration arxl to the 
politicians. Already this might help to avoid the risk of halrperirg extra-EC 
cuupetitors am to S\JRX)rt the "Fortress Europe". 
(2)  Greater  transparency  would  mean  greater  aCCOlnltability  to the  public 
regard.in;J  who  benefits ani who  pays  for any measure ani what the costs of 
measures are.  How  can this be  achieved  ?  One possibility is to investigate 
systematically  into  side-effects  of  planned  market  interventions,  e.g. 
market-entry regulations,  ani to look for less intensive intel.ventions.  So 
all measures  of the  int:enlal.  market  programme  ani all  respective  Council 
decisions  'WOUld  have  to  be  checked  as  to  whether  they  still allow  for 
market-entry ani other carpetition-reducirg or discriminatirg policies. 
Another  possibility  might  be  to  finarx::e  allcx:ative  European  policies 
acx:ordirg to the equivalence principle am to losen the principle of non-
affectation.  Although  European policies ani especially the int:enlal. market 
programme  are  not  particularly  expemiture-intensive,  the  equivalence 
principle  OJUld  be  used  toore.  European  in:iust.ry  'WOUld  have to pay an  R&D 
levy to finarx::e  nettl  R&D  programs of the EEC,  if it  has finally been decided 
to SURX>rt  R&D  at EEC  level,  users of EC-financed infrastructure 'WOUld  have 
to pay an infrastructure toll,  etc.  In this way,  beneficiaries have to pay 
for what  they use  (e.g.  bridges,  tunnels)  while political institutions at 
the  European  level  'WOUld  only  influence  the  allocation  of  financial 
resources  am  help  to  raise  the  IOOney  on  the  (capital)  markets.  'Ihe 
situation for the beneficiary 'WOUld  d'large dramatically.  European  .in:lustry 
'WOUld  finarx::e  European  research progranunes  fran which it benefits,  etc.  Up 
to  now,  the  burden  of  J'le'W  p:rogranmes  is distributed annrg all tax payers 
while  the  pressure  groups  are  hcm::genous  in their struggle  for  increased 
financial resources.  '1he switch to the equivalence principle 'WOUld  hopefully -39-
lead to a  discussion within the beneficicu:y groups,  on the choice between 
cla.imi.nj for 100re progranmes ani payin:J higher R&D  tax or R&D  oontributions, 
etc. 
A  third  possibility  is to  inp:rove  transparency  is  by  :restructurin;  the 
system  of  benefits,  e.g.  to  charge  the  :redistr.ib.Jtion  CCilpOl'le11t  of  the 
Ccmoon  Agricultural  Policy  so  that  farmers  receive  an  explicit  incare 
subsidy  which  is  linked  to  the  incare  ani  not  an  inplicit  subsidy  via 
allocative  interventions  into  the  market  mechanism  for  agricultural 
products.  '1he  current system hides the level of subsidy to each fanner arrl 
whether these subsidies are related to incare levels.  '1he  new  system would 
make the subsidy to each fanner p.lblic knowledge ani thereby ensure that the 
poorest  farmers  would  get  highest  subsidies.  '1he  justification  for 
subsidisin:J agricultural incare could then be openly debated. 
(3)  All  these  ~es  in existin;  procedures- would  help  to  reduce  the 
asymetric  influence  of  pressure  groups  by  buildi.n;J  up  CXlUllter-influences 
within  affected  groups  or  by  activatin;  other  pressure  groups.  As  these 
measures might not be sufficient additional institutional safeguards should 
be  inplemented which reduce possibilities for rent-seeki.n;J activities.  Sane 
shall be mentioned here: 
- limittin; sectoral state aid on the national ani sub-naional level by law, 
e.g.  similar  to  p.lblic  borrowin:j  limits  in  several  CXlUlltries. 
Consequently,  new  state aids will only be granted if other state aids are 
cut.  At  the  European  level,  no  sectoral  state  aids  should  pert1aps  be 
allaied at all; 
- all state aids  should  be  time  limitted  ani degressive  in their design. 
'!his would SlJR)Ort the necessary structural adjustment process; 
- statutory market-entry ani price regulations should also be time limitted. 
'!his list of institutional safeguards against rent-seeki.n;J activities is not 
at all canplete or sufficient.  It gives,  ha,ever,  a  first inpression,  with -40-
which means the negative inpact of rent-seeki.rq activities could be reduced. 
F'Urt:henoo:re,  it is also necessary to charge the  incentives of politicians 
ani bureaucrats. 
5.  2.  'l1iE  mCENI'IVES  OF  :EOLITICIANS  AND  li.JRFAIJ(WaS 
'!he  incentives  to  politicians  ani  bureaucrats,  provided  by  the 
institutional system,  are quite different fran  those given to managers  in 
the private  sector.  '!his difference  in incentives  leads to inefficiencies 
ani  thus  government  failures.  'lhree  elements  of  this  problem  are  noN 
considered  :  one is the input orientation of the pmlic sector,  the secorrl 
is the lack of control on the legislature ani executive ani finally the lack 
of  positive  ani  negative  strokes  for  the  perfonnance  of  bureaucrats  and 
politicians.  'Dle  prd:>lems  with  incentive  stru.ctures  is  a  reality  on  all 
levels of Government  includirg the European level. 
(1)  One reason for government failure is the input-orientation of the public 
sector ani the pmlic budget.  While private sector enterprises ani their 
managers  are  output-orientated  (the  goal  is  profit) ,  ministries  arrl 
bureaucrats  are  input-orientated  because  of  a  lack  of  operationalized 
output goals.  '!he input-orientation of the budgetary system,  for example, 
encourages  both  bureaucrats  ani  politicians  to  increase  input,  i.e. 
financial  resources,  ani  not  output.  '!his  leads  to  an  increase  of 
resources claimed by the pmlic sector ani discourages efficiency in the 
provision of pmlic services.  As regards non-experditure-:related programs 
ani  intel:ventions,  e.g.  anti  -dun'pirg  measures  or  other  tariff  arrl 
non-tariff  trade  barriers  a  similar  argumentation  is  possible:  After 
inplementinj  a  protectionist  measure  politicians  arrl  bureaucrats  look 
only  how  effective  the  measure  (input)  is,  without  carinJ  about  the 
output,  e.g.  oanpetition  arrl  price-settinj  behaviour  in the  protected 
branch.  'lherefo:re,  such measures  should be  time  limitted ani the proof 
that  (  1)  a  continuation of the measure urrler consideration is necessary 
ani  (2)  that it is a  better alternative  canpared to others  should  be 
provided in an operational manner by those who demarrl its continuation. -41-
(2)  'Ihe  absence  of  operational  out.pit  qoals  is  one  item  which  makes  it 
difficult for both,  the opposition ani the voter to blame the govemment 
or the administration for not havi.rg fulfilled its tarqets.  In the case 
of the EX:,  the voter or the q:position  (the European Parliament)  have not 
even  the  power  to ·make  the  <l:Jun:::il  ani the  Ccmnission a~le  for 
their actions.l5 'Ibis may  explain,  why it has been possible to nm the 
Ccm:OC>n  Agricultural  Policy for nm-e  than  20  years.  It could pertlaps be 
helpful to give the Parliament am not the national govemments the power 
am  responsibility to accept  or refuse  every  intividual  member  of the 
Ccmnission  every  four  years.  '!hat  ~d provide  the  intividual 
Ccmnissioner  with  a  greater  incentive to take  acx::nmt  of  the  European 
Parliament view in his sphere of activity.  '!he  influence of subnational 
partial interest groups could perllaps also be reduced at least relative 
to the canmission. 
(3)  Unlike the market,  the ~lie  sector is not greatly affectEd by business 
cycles,  which  lead  to  enployment  fluctuations,  bankruptcies  and  the 
selection  effects  of  carpetition.  '!he  absence  of  efficiency-supporting 
cyclical  selection  in  canbination  with  the  risk-reducing  statutes 
~lyin; to civil servants have protected bureaucrats fran censure when 
intividual out.pit is inadequate or when bureaucrats were too prepared to 
fulfill  rent-seeki.rg  de.marxis.  'Ihe  institutional  structure  of  the 
Ccmrami.ties  is partly  a  replica  of  national  structures  and  thus  the 
incentive structure has similarly been replicated.  In the short nm,  no 
c.harges  seem  likely.  Nevertheless,  a  refonn of the  incentive  structure 
should be put on the policy agen::la.  Major  i.nprovements could be achieved 
by a  refonn of statutes applyirg to civil servants. 
A  combination of these three  items has  led to politicians ani bureaucrats 
seekirg 100re  powers  (higher budgets)  am less responsibility.  'Ibis struggle 
still takes place on all levels of government.  'Ihe :reoarmen:iation  in this 
context nust be  that,  in looki.rg at the future of European  integration,  a 
15 'Ihe  only possibility the  Parliana1t  has  to  "~"  the  Council  is to 
brirg it to the  Colirt of Justice.  '1he  Parlianelt has done this once  in 
the  field  of  Ccmoon  ~rt  Policy  •. 'Ihe  Ccmnission  can  only  be 
"PUnished"  py refusin; the v1.sa  for a  BUaget.  In such a  case the entire 
CCmnission is dismissEi:l.  'Ibis has,  hC1tieVer,  never happened up to now. -42-
c.han:Je  in the  institutionalized process  shc:W.d  be  guarantee:l  so  that  new 
pov1erS are always ac::xxupanied by co~  responsibilities an:l that all 
progrmrmes have to be evaluated as regards their final cutpJt. 
5.  3.  'lHE IIlr-INFORMED  AND  UNINl'ERESTED  VOl'ER 
Government failure is oot a  p:rct>lem  peculiar to Eul:qlean integration; it is 
a  CUIIILil prd:>lem  in the provision of p.lblic seiVioes.  In a  way the internal 
market  progrmrme  is  a  tool  to  :reduce  an:l  rut  back  national  govennnent 
failure  in  several  fields  of  allocation  policy,  e.g.  oot  ecananically 
justified market-entry  regulations.  'lberefore,  it should  be  avoided  that 
national govemment failure will be replaced by a  European one. 
An  inportant soorce of government  failure can be  identified in the control 
institutions  provided  by  the  deroocratic  system  - the  voter's  control  on 
government - which is,  in reality,  quite inadequate.  Often, it is necessary 
for the media to fulfil the role of cont:rollin;J politicians an:l bureaucrats. 
'lhus,  any  (Eul:qlean)  policy  which  is  int:.eJned  to  :reduce  (Eul:qlean) 
government failures has to inp:rove the i.Jx:entive structure of the  (Eul:qlean) 
voter.  the  voter's  incentive  structure,  however,  is  a  result  of  the 
institutionalized  system.  'lhe  ideal  solution is to afford  the  (Eul:qlean) 
voter,  as a  participant in the political process,  the same power as that of 
the consumer in the marketplace. 
However,  there are many  institutional constraints ani  failures within the 
EUl:q:)ean  political deeision-mak:in:J  process  which disccmage the voter fran 
acx;IUirin;J  information ani givin;J him the same  power as in the marketplace. 
'lhese constraints are,  of course,  oot only evident  on the European level, 
but  also  on  the  national  level.  In  a  way  these  problems  within  European 
institutions  only inirror  prOOlems  which  already exist within the national 
stnlctures. 
What  does this mean  in the Eul:qlean context ani for the Eul:qlean political 
decision-mak:irg process ? -43-
As  already pointed out in chapter 3.  2  the European voter has  no  power to 
directly  influence  the  provision  of  goods  at  European  level.  'lb  counter 
this,  it would  be  necessacy  (am  not  only  on  the  European  level)  to 
reinforce the principle of "uno acto" in votirg so that a  votirg decision is 
not split into one  which  shapes  the  ''benefit"  structure am another which 
shapes the cost am "financirg" structure  (e.g.  by the Agricultural Council 
or the Research  &  Developnent  Council  am the Financial  Council).  On  the 
cont.racy,  a  decision on any measure  shoo.ld  include a  sinultaneous decision 
on  financirg  these  measures.  A  mini.n1Im  requirement  on  the  European  level 
would,  therefore,  be the establishment of Qmoon Councils,  e.g.  agriculture 
am finance.  'lb give the voter lOOre  power,  however,  requires a  reduction in 
the power am iniepen:ience of existirg institutions. 
Necessary  refo:rms  are  unlikely  to  take  place  in  the  near  future  as  the 
present  situation  is  not  characterized  by  the  fanoJS  "curtain  of 
uncertainty"  about  the  future  situation  of  the  present  actors.  In  other 
words,  those  institutions  which  are  in  power  am  have  a  high  margin  of 
manoeuvre  in their operations are also  in charge of refonnirg themselves. 
Since they are aware that they would lose power in any refonn am would have 
to introduce greater transparency into the system,  they are not willirg to 
uniertake such a  refonn. 
In lookirg at less ambitious  refonn measures  we  will fim the problematic 
principle of non-affectation.16 'lb  avoid the inefficiencies resultirg fran 
this principle,  the  EC  budget  could  be  split into different budgets with 
different fiscal  resources,  e.g.  one  for agriculture,  one  for research arrl 
developnent,  one  for  structural  :furrls,  etc  ••  Responsible  politicians  for 
these budgets would have to look for sources to finance their experxlitures. 
'!his  would  at  least  ensure  greater  transparency  in  the  financirg  of 
different  policies.  Furt:henoore,  the  intividual  budgets  would  no  longer 
carpete with each other for resources  fran total plblic revenues but would 
have  to  CXIl'pete  with  the  private  sector.  '!he  Council  for  Research  arrl 
16 '!his  principle  means  that  all  PQlicies  are  financed  out  of  total 
available  reoeip-Q;  am no  receipt is affected to a  special  ~ture 
p~.  '!he  introduction  of"  this princJ£le  of  non-affect:atl.on  is 
sanetimes called the "first fall of 11Bll1  of  lie finance  (GR>SSEKEITIER 
1987,  p.  405). -44-
Developnent 'Walld mt have to justify an iix:rease in the R&D  fee expentiture 
on its policies to the Financial camcil but it 'Walld  have to justify it to 
the  ente:t:prise  sector.  Public ~  'Walld  shift  away  fran  input 
orientation  (how  nuch  tax  receipts  are  available  ?)  to  ll¥)re  output-
orientation  (is it TNOrthwhile  to collect  JID1leY  for this  fran the private 
sector?).  'lhe :recx:mneroation is therefore:  'lb attach prices to policies and 
let the groups benefitinj fran a  policy be  responsible for its financinj, 
also.  However,  oonsiderinj the results of the plblic choice theory,  this is 
quite  unlikely  to  hawen  for  the  time  bei.rq.  Nevertheless,  one  should 
continue to struggle for such refonns. 
6.  CXfiCIDDING  REMARKS 
'!here  are  opportunities  and  risks  connected  with  the  CCilpletion  of  the 
internal  market  - possibilities  of  increased  growth,  Employment,  and 
cuup::tition for ente:t:prises and governments.  'lhe risks shown  in this paper 
and analysed with the help of the plblic choice theory do not greatly affect 
the short-tenn opportunities but are ll¥)re  relevant to the medium  and  long 
tenn perfonnanoe.  Risks are seen  (in aCX'!O:r:t1ara::  with the view of BERNHOLZ) 
as  referri.rq  to  the  influence  of  interest  groups,  which  may  lead  to  a 
Fortress Europe and to cx:upatition for subsidies.  FUrt:herloore,  the attitude 
of  national  politicians  in  alla.~inj ~  and  co-operation  on  both 
national  and  international  level  may  lead  to  a  llDlOpolisation  of  the 
European market  in the lag nm.  'lhe reasons  for this ll¥)re  gloany picture 
are  the  asymmetric  influence  of  interest  groups  CXIl'lbi.ned  with  certain 
institutional  details  of the political  decision-makirg  process  supporti.rq 
the darger of government failure,  especially on the European level. 
Public awareness of the internal market's effect in increasinj the asymetric 
influence  moong  interest  groups  nust  be  increased.  '!he  reason  for  this 
interaction  of  asymetry  is  that  the  first  groups  reorganized  at 
international level will be the small and already well organized  (producer) 
groups,  while  those,  which  already have  problems with  organization on  the 
national level  (consumers,  tax payers but also trade wrl.ons) ,  will have even 
greater problems on the European level. -45-
'lhe  institutionalized  problems,  which  mainly  result  in  an  urxlisturbed 
intet:play  between  interest  groops,  politicians  ani  Wreaucrats  at  the 
E.\lrcpean  level  may  lead  to  W'el.fare  losses  for  non-participatirg  groups. 
F\lrthe.noo:re,  it is ~in  whether the so-called "Fortress Europe"  can be 
avoided,  when one considers that cxaupetitors fran art:side the EC have little 
influence on this intet:play, while interference fran within the EC will also 
remain quite ~-
Sane hints have been given in chapter 5  on measures to reduce these risks of 
W'el.fare  loss.  'Ihe nost inportant measure is a  too:re  systematic introduction 
of all affected groops  into the institutionalized decision-ma.ki.nj process, 
especially if they are not well-organized  on the national level.  A  secorxi 
measure is a  :refonn of the financirg  structure to increase transparency of 
costs ani benefits by  switchirg to equivalence  financirg  arxi  by  weakening 
the  principle  of  non-affectation.  Both  measures  should  result  in  a 
reduction in the influence of minority interest groops ani a  st.ren]thening 
of  the  position  of  consumers  ani voters.  ntis  measure  could  be  further 
strergthened by givirg the  Parliament  the  right to naninate or to refuse 
irrlividual Ccmnissioners. 
Sane  items  touched  in  this  paper  go  beyoni  the  1992  deadline.  '!his  is 
because  the  problems are too:re  turxmme.ntal..  Nevertheless,  they still affect 
the final outcane of the internal market programme.  Easy solutions to these 
problems cannot be presented in this paper.  However,  knowledge of the risks 
may  make it easier for the people ani institutions in charge to face them. 
'lhus,  additional  ani  too:re  detailed  researdl  in  this  field  is  clearly 
desirable.  F\lrthe.noo:re,  the analytical tool of plblic choice theory,  used in 
this paper,  could also be aR>lied in redesignirg the political an:l economic 
stn1ctu:res  of  Fastem  E.\lrcpean  countries.  Sane  of  the  rec::xmnerXIations, 
briefly soetched in chapter 5,  might also ~rthwile to be disoJSSed in this 
different cxmtext. -46-
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